'F 83 File 82/27-II QATAR OIL' [‎247v] (510/630)

6
The Barr-al-Qaraii District. v | ■
18. The importance of this district for the present purpose is first that it emWJ
the coastal strip lying between the blue line and the pre-war western extremity of 1c
Qatar, and secondly that it appears to correspond fairly closely, if not exactly with ll
the triangle of land lying to the east of the blue line, which falls within the am W, '
• 0 k . oJT 0 rough line indicted to Ibn SaV and Major Holmes by Sir P Ool
m 1922 (see paragraph 6 above) Mr. Philby, with the assistance of recommendation^
and guides furnished by Ibn Jiluwi, the Saudi Governor of Hasa, travelled throuo-h
a portion of it m 1932. The impression left by his " Empty Quarterns thaT tS
J n ?u en ^ e . atpr f se , nt , the SMdi Government and the £
tlems
, , i-v , *1 f. , ^ una toawaai vjtu vtlllHieni
Ikhwan. IJetails of the Barr-al-Qarah district are given in the extract from Ijorlm^r
reproduced as item I (v) m the Appendix to this Note. As will be seen, Lorimpr
considered that it " might perhaps be reckoned as included in the Saniaq of Ha-a
1 h 4-1^ „ /"Vi, <^1 I* ll-Cl
plw
jafit
OffilSf
respec
propei
mie
a?oi(li
i\h
nab
in
anil m
. O - JT- XU uuc uaxijau ui naea —
in other words, m the pre-war Ottoman Sandjaq of Nejd. On this assumption the
boundaries of Nejd m the 1913 Convention might well have been fixed so as to
include it, with the result that the limits of Nejd woald have touched the pre -war
limits of Qatar on the coastline at the head of Dohat-as-Salwa Bay, the hinterland ^
(actually the^ Jafurah Desert) being left in indeterminate ownership. For whatever
reason (and .it must be assumed that substantial justification was produced to persuade ^
the lurks to relinquish their position in the Barr-al-Qarah) the line was in fact fixed F
t0 • WeSt ' Bat tlie hist0 F'T of tile Barr-al-Qarah, and the fact that the ^
191,3 Couven.^on had never been ratified, may well have been the reasons which led :n " 1 '
feir P. Cox in 1922 to fix the limits of Hasa at a point which included in it the
Barr-al-Qarah rather than at the blue line of the 1913 Convention.
Conclusions.
19. In the light of the examination of the position given above, and subject to the
observations of the Government of India and the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. , the best course
would appear to be the following :—
(a) Boundaries of Qatar. To agree that the boundaries of Qatar shall he-accepted
as being on the north, east and west, the sea ; on the south, a line running
across the base of the Peninsula from a point not south of the latitude of the , a ,
head of Dohat-as-Salwa Bay to a point not south of the north side of thlf
Ivhor-al-Odeid inlet. Ihe line indicated on the I.P .O. map would satisfy/ 1 ' MI
these criteria, and if it is confirmed that it is the line at present claimed by
the Sheikh of Qatar it could be accepted. A slight modification to bring
the line some 12 miles south to the head of Dohat-as-Salwa Bay, and so to
reduce the area of sea coast in indeterminate ownership, could be considered
if necessary.
(h) The blue line of the 1913 Convention, to be maintained as against Ibn Sand,
for the reasons given in paragraph 11 above, as the eastern boundary of
Saudi Arabia.
(c) If a claim is advanced by Ibn Sand to the Barr-al-Qarah on the ground of the
line indicated by Sir Percy Cox in the Oqair conversations in 1922, referred,
to in paragraph 6, that His Majesty's Government should either—
(i) concede the claim, on the ground, if necessary, that they regarded | u |
themselves as committed by the informal conversations of 1922, but
without prejudice to the maintenance in principle of the blue line, and in ,
return for a formal recognition by Ibn Sand of the validity of this line, fcjo
The attribution to Ibn Saud of the Barr-al-Qarah area, undesirable as it
may be oil other grounds, would have the advantage of leaving no gap of ^
indeterminate territory bordering on the sea coast, for we can without
diffipulty, as suggested in (a) above, recognise the frontiers of Qatar as )| e ^j
beginning at Dohat-as-Salwa, i.e. at the point at which the Barr-al-Qarah
e nds. _ _
v (ii) If it. was thought preferable to make no concession in respect of ^
\ the blue line, then to argue that informal discussions such as those of
1922, which had never been confirmed in writing or been the subject
of formal agreement, had no binding effect, and that His Majesty's L . c
Government took their stand on the blue line. Play might be made with J '
the fact that the line drawn by Sir Percy Cox would, in fact, deprive Ibn
Saud of a substantial area lying, between Diau-al-Dukhan and the western wi
side of the blue line. *