'Gazetteer of Arabia Vol. I' [‎240] (255/1050)

240
'ASlR
the Imam's rupture with the Turks is a necessary preliminary and that the Iclrisgi is in
a position to drive a harder bargain than in 1910.
Military organization and resources.
TurJcish. —The Turkish forces 'Aslr consist of the 21st Independent Division, com
manded by Muhi-ud-din Bey and composed of the following units; —
Infantry Regiment No. 118 p battalion).
Infantry Regiment No. 121 {3 battalions), 0. C. Assim Bey.
Infantry Regiment No. 122 (3 battalions), a C. Faizi Bey.
Infantry Regiment No. 123 (3 battalions), 0. a Ali Rida Bey.
The 123rd Regiment seems to have been formed shortly before the war. The batta An extra allowance of pay granted to soldiers involved in special field service or to public servants on special duty.
lion of the 118th arrived in 'Asir from Yemen in the autumn of 1913.
Companies are about 160 strong and the total force was estimated afabout^OOO in
November 1915. "
It is divided between Qunfudah and Abha, with a preponderance at the latter place.
In 1914 there was also a strong post at Muhal, but it is not known whether this is stiJl
iield.
There are also the following corps troops i —
Four mountain batteries. One train company.
Two machine gun companies. One telegraph company.
Four Mantelli 7 • 5-centimetre guns at Abha.
In addition to the above there are four companies of locally recruited foot-gendarmes
cand one company of mounted gendarmes.
The Turks can also count upon the support of the tribes in the immediate neighbour
hood of the places which they hold. Round Qunfudah they have the Bani Zaid and
the Beni la^alah, neither of them fighting tribes, but, as they showed in 1910 quite
ready to take up arms against the Idrissi The Turkish hold on Muhail is precarious,
as they only have a section of the A1 Musa with them, and it is probable that they
would abandon this place, if indeed they have not already done so, in the event of
genuine attack by the Idrissi.
Round Abha their position is stronger. By intermarriage and the grant of civil
honours to its principal Shaikhs they have gained the support of the powerful tribe
of the Bani Mughaid and they can also count on the ' Alqam-al-Hul and the Banl
jMalak. Their influence extends also to some of the Shahran and Bani Shihar • but
these tribes are more particularly faithful to the Sharif of Mecca and would not assist
the Turks except against the Idrissi, and only then if the latter were still at enmity
with the Sharif. J
2. Idrissi.—The Idrissi's standing army consists of about 500 Sudanese reeurited
from the villages round his capital, Sahya, and chiefly used for police work or as his
personal guard in normal times. In times of war he depends entirely on the tribes for
support. His system is simple. He has about ten maqadim or generals, almost invari
ably chosen from the leading families of Saadah (Saiyids) or Ashraf (Sharifs), each of
whom is entrusted with a district or a group of tribes with which he is required to keep
in touch at all times. When troops are required, each general is ordered to produce a
specified number of men and he in turn makes the tribal sheikhs responsible for carrving
out the order. Exemption is purchased by the payment of twenty-four rials.
The army thus formed is a conglomeration of small bands, skilled in tribal warfare
but untrained and undisciplined according to European standards, and generally
divided against itself by petty tribal quarrels and jealousies. Each tribal unit brings
its own food and as many rifles as it can, and the Idrissi is responsible for making up
the number and for supplying ammunition. In addition, he has to make handsome
presents to all the chief shaikhs. Unless there is a good prospect of loot, it is difficult
to collect the Arabs in any numbers, and in any case their natural independence and
thdr dislike of restraint render them unsuitable for a long campaign. This and their
disinclination to face modern artillery were among the chief causes which led to their
failure before Lahiyah m 1915. The Idrissi is poorly supplied with artillery and its
ammunition and with trained men to serve the guns. Theoretically he can put a very
large army into the field, but m practice he probably cannot muster more than 25,000
men for offensive purposes. He is hampered by the fact that the tribes refuse to go far
from their own boundaries and therefore he has to depend on the material available
in the particular district in which he is operating.