'Statement [on the expedition to Mesopotamia] by Political Secretary, India Office' [‎2v] (4/6)

4
to cause much, popular excitement and greatly to strengthen the hands of the war
party. If, as at one time seemed not impossible, Turkish troops had reached the
Afghan frontier in any considerable strength, there can be little doubt that the
Amir's opposition must have broken down, and that a situation of extreme peril
would have arisen on the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India.
Mr. Marling telegraphed from Teheran on the 7th September 1 :—" The Germans are
" strengthening their position here every day,
1 Mr. Nliulmg 10 l^orcign ()itice, No. ..Jl, " and could even now by the same methods as
dated 7th September 1915. ,, i i a r i i
1 employed at Ispahan render our position
"untenable. It is therefore . . . a question of . . . how long the Germans
" will hold their hand, and we can scarcely hope that the Germans will wait for some
" signal success, such as the forcing of the Dardanelles, to alter the position. The
" capture of Bagdad would in my opinion be much more to the purpose "
On the 30th September Mr. Marling 2 telegraphed as follows :—
" German position here depends entirely on their keeping open the road to
Bagdad via Kermanshah. Yesterday, German
^ * olvl ^ 0lfice ' No - Minister told newly appointed Governor of
873, dated 30th beptember 1910. i, i, 4. • p , 1 • ^ • r
Kermansnan that, 11 there was any intention of
his bringing about return of British and Russian Consuls, Governor's own arrival
would be forcibly prevented, as German interests could not permit the possibility of
closing their only means of communicating with the outer world, through which they
receive news and money, &c. If Grand Duke could now send enough troops to hold
both Kazvin and Kermanshah until our own troops reach Bagdad, and can control
Khanekin road, Germans would be left en Vair. Kermanshah is now virtually in the
possession of the Germans, as the greater part of Kaouf's regulars have been
surreptitiously brought in, and German Consul is still busy proselytising, and may
perhaps now have altogether 2,000 men in his pay."
On the 1st October he again telegraphed 3 :—
" All reports show that Germans are bringing in very considerable quantities of
, , r ^ ^ v arms and ammunition via Kermanshah to
374^ dated' ist Octobei - ioio'"' ^ ^P^an and that practically the whole of (he
Lurkisn lorce under Kaouf Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. that has
been waiting at Saripul has been brought surreptitiously to Kermanshah, where
German Vice-Gonsul is said to have also some 1,100 tribesmen in his pay. This
may indicate an attempt to reach Afghanistan with a considerable force."
III.— The Advance to Bagdad.
Such was the position when the question of an immediate advance to Bagdad was
raised by General Nixon at the beginning of October. British prestige in Persia, and
indeed throughout the Middle East (and it must be remembered that our whole position
was based upon nothing more tangible than prestige), probably stood at a lower
ebb than at any period during the past 50 years. As early as the 15th April
1915, the British Consul at Kermanshah had found it necessary, in the face
of the Turkish advance, to retire to Ramadan ; on the 10th September the
entire British and Russian colonies, including the consular ollicers, had been
compelled to leave Ispahan. Elsewhere in the interior of Persia our Consuls
still remained at their posts; but their position was exceedingly insecure, as was
demonstrated a few weeks later. when the British Consul and the whole
British colony at Shiraz were arrested by local tribesmen at the instigation of
the notorious German agent, Wassmuss. Hamadan had to be abandoned on the
23rd November, and, by the enforced withdrawal of the British Consul and colony
on 18th December, Kerman passed into the hands of the Germans. Kerman
thenceforward became (as was anticipated) the base from which German parties
struck north-east towards Afghanistan and south-east to Baluchistan. Several were
successful in reaching the former country, while in the latter they created a wave
of fanaticism which swept across to the borders of Sind, and has not even yet spent
itself. It was known that in no circumstances could the Government of India spare
troops to deal effectively with the situation. Yet to leave it meant the gravest risk
of an explosion in Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. , which would not only
have taxed the military resources of India to the utmost, but might even have led to
a demand for reinforcements from other theatres of war.