'File 19/165 III (C 24) Bahrain Reforms' [‎61r] (128/426)

presumably had been prepared beforehand, and having read it out to the crowd,
handed it to Major Daly. The gist of this letter (as reported in my telegram
No. 88, dated 15th January) is that Sheikh Hamad is prepared to take
whatever action he is directed to do by Government but is unable to do
anything without such orders. In this connection I forward herewith a copy
of a telegram from the Bahreini community dated 15th instant reporting this
incident and imploring the assistance of Government.
5. Previous to the arrival of Sheikh Hamad certain members of the
Baharnah community had presented a petition to Major Daly on the 13th
instant asking him to forward to me a copy of a monster petition signed and
sealed by hundreds of Bahrein Shiahs. These were duly forwarded to me and
a copy of each of them is annexed, for the information of Government.
6. Prior to the receipt of these petitions two Bahrein Shiah subjects
came over to Bushire by the mail steamer which brought Sheikh Hamad
from Lingah, bringing a petition to me (copy annexed) Th ^y asked for
an interview and a reply which they C'Mild take back to the Bahrein Shiah
community. I interviewed them on Saturday the 12th instant, and yesterday
gave them a reply to their petition, a copy of which is annexed for inform
ation, and I told the petitioners very much what I have said in my written
reply, viz., that Rome was not built in a day, in other words. But time is
going on now and six months have elapsed since we started to introduce the
reforms, and it is certain that if the Khalifah family can organize such out
rages more or less with impunity, the reforms will be a farce.
7. I enclose, for the information of the Government of India, a copy
of Major Daly's letter, No. 13-C., dated 15th January, reporting the incident.
It will be seen from this and from the petition of the Bahrein Shiah com
munity that the punishment meted out for the last Sitrah outrage was not
sufficient. The banishment of Sheikh Selman bin Khalid to Katar is a farce,
while Sheikh Ali who was sent to Bombay at the expense of the Bahrein
Government is really now more comfortable than he has been in his life.
It seems necessary therefore if it is found that Sheikh Khalid or his son
Ibrahim instigated or abetted this crime to punish them more severely,: banish
ment or deportation on more stringent terms seems called for, perhaps banish
ment with a term of imprisonment to start with.
8. As I have already suggested in my telegram, No. '51, dated 10th
January, 1 think the institution of the Levy Corps at Bahrein should be
expediied. and that if ttie Muscat Government agrees, as many men as can
be spared should be lent to the Bahrein Government pending the raising of,
the men for the Bahrein Corps by the Comm'andant of the Muscat Levy
Corps.
9. I consider that if men are available and are sent to Bahrein, as soon
as they have settled down a detachment should be sent to Sitrah to protect
the place, and its cost recovered from the emoluments and revenue of Sheikh
Khalid and Sheikh Ibrahim. Other detachments could later be placed at
suitable places to protect Shiahs from these outrages, and if a detachment has
to be placed at any place as the result of an outrage the cost of such a
detachment should be met (at least as far as possible) from the revenues of the
members of the Khalifah family or Headman of the tribe, shown to have
instigated the outrage, or if it was committed by a Sunni village, from that
village.
10. It will be seen from the correspondence, as already reported in
my telegram. No. 90, dated loth January, that Sheikh Hamad is quite
incapable of taking action in the face of the opposition of the w hole Khalifah
family. He may feel rather stronger when the Levies are in beinrf, but I
doubt if he will really be ever strong enough to do much; besides at heart he
feels with all the Khalifah family that the Baharnah are there to be outraged
and fleeced and oppressed, and is really not in sympathy with any ideas of
improving their position.
,11. I have, unless my memory plays me false, stated on several occasions
that the principal difficulty in introducing reforms in Bahrein is the impossibi
lity of finding anyone among the ruling family or upper class capable of