‘Notes and private telegram from the Viceroy regarding the future settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia and Arabia.’ [‎82r] (11/20)

jn view of the nomadic charatier of the neiglibouring tribes, a (leliuite
protectorate in the immediate neighbourhood is rlio only alternative to the
annexation of a much larger area. Northwards, therefore, of the Fatha-
Ana line, and westwards of the Euphrates, agreements with the tribes are
necessary in order to secure the trade routes, whether roads or railways, to
legnlate paM nir i i^lits, aiKI to prevent those tribes from becoming instruments
of intrigue in the hands of possibly unscrupulous neighbours. This much
must be undertaken, whatever happens to Arabia.
But when we come to Arabia itself the position is very different. We
already stand in treaty relation- with the whole of the East and South Coast
ol Arabia from Koweit to Aden, and they are essential to the security of our
position in the Persian Uulf and to our communications with India. I kit
except on the coast there is no reason why we should come into contact with
tlie tribes at all. Kor in the interior we have no interests whatever, and the
t reaty which is now being negotiated with Bin Sand has been necessitated solelv
by the fact o( his recent acquisition of the Katif Coast. We have neither the
desire nor the power to interfere with the Chiefs of the interior, and what
.s more important, the Chiefs of the interior have not the slightest intention
,of allowing themselves to be interfered with. What thev want -ami it is
probably true to say of them, as Captain Shakespear has said of Bin Sand
though doubtless in varying degrees, that they are 44 animated bv intense
P a ^ r]0 tJ 5 >m for [their] country, a profound veneration for [their]'religion
and a single-minded desire to do [their] best for [their] people "-what
they want is ' Arabia lor the Arabs " ; and all they want of us is a guarantee
against attack by sea and our good offices in securing their independence in
the settlement at the end of the war. This, it is submitted, we are in a
position to give them — we have indeed already promised it to Bin Sand
Mavia, the Idnsi, and the Sharif of Mecca, and it is less, rather than more'
dangeious to complete the network of agreements. The u protectorate " over
Arabia there ore amounts to nothing inore than Arabia for the Arabs under
the a?gis of Great Britain. unuei
X. Persia. 'J 'he Mesopotamiau question necessarily raises that of Persia
il onh because as we are at this moment learning to our cost, the neutralitv
occujutloii of Arabistan anil I.unstan are essential to the security of Basra
Moreover, it is obvious that if Russia, who already dominates Azerbaijan is
.lace. possession oi the whole of the Turkish side of the frontier down' to
a ukm, hei hold on not them I ersia will be immenselv strengthened \o\\
therefore, is the time to come to terms with her. It is submitted that the
x P ell( : nce ot the last seven years proves conclusively that no settlement can
be satisfaetoiT which does not eliminate the neutral zone. There wis ,
two-fold reason for creating that zone : (1) to avoid an undue eMonsion of
our responsibilities, (2) to avoid a conterminous frontier witli liussia Tl
acquisition of the Anglo-Persian oil-fields at ,he other end of Persia s
stultified the first. The second is one of those sup...,itt.'s which Ih.C
on in offices ong after they have lost all reality in practice. If Tlie
f xpeiience ol the last hall century in the East teaches anything it is surelv
.he futility the buffer-State, and, a /ort/or/, of the^uffe*-zone Thi
stheiue that has been outlined above lor the re-arraiigement of Eastern
luikej in Asia aims at the elimination of the buffer-State, and is intended
lo leave no neutral zones or no-mans-lands ; and it is believed that we slnll
ou > get rid ot friction in Persia by doing the same there. But the abolition
o the neutral zone can only be effective for this purpose if there Is he
clearest possible understanding that each Power is free to do what it likes
But the difficulty as has been more than once urged—is to arrive u
an equitable division of the neutral sphere. For our niterests are so dis^
nbnted o\ei it geographically that there would seem to be almost nothino-
with which we can afford to part. In the extreme west Luristan cf
Arabistan are essential to the security of lower Mesopotamia as well as
being the region in which 2,000,000?. have recently been sunk, h, t h (
(entu it is ditucult to see how we can give Russia anything south of Ispahan
ithout bringing her down m dangerous proximity to the Gulf and it tin-
same time cutting off our own access to the north, whether r/d Ahwa/-f S p a h '!
oi I nslnre-bhiiaz-Ispahan. In the extreme east there is nothing that we can