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‘File 28/7 I War: Propaganda: local opinion’ [‎224v] (453/664)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (326 folios). It was created in 25 May 1940-15 Mar 1942. It was written in English and Arabic. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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right to retaliate for alleged breaches of the rules of warfare by Britain, and not
on the rights generally recognised to accrue to a belhgeient as a consequence of
an effective blockade. , , „ i ,11 • j 1 .,1
The legitimacy of the “ total blockade should be judged therefore not
upon the basis of the rules applicable to a true blockade, but lathei as a factor
in the proclamation of a “war zone. In this connexion the following points
become relevant:—
To what extent are the grounds for retaliation alleged by Germany valid ?
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The only accusations upon which even the Germans appear to lay any weight are,
first, that the British sought to enforce the “ hunger blockade ” against Germany,
and, secondly, that the British navicert system is illegal, and that neutrals who
comply with it are committing an unneutral act.
As regards the first accusation, it may suffice to quote Bismarck (as we did
to the United States Government in 1915). Referring to the treatment of rice
as contraband of war by belligerents in Chinese waters in 1885, a measure which
incidentally interfered with German commercial interests, Bismarck said : “ 1 j
measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the
difficulties of the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced
against all neutral ships.” It is clear, therefore, that, quite apart from the fact
that the stoppage of all food-stuffs is an admitted consequence of any blockade,
Bismarck regarded a so-called “ hunger blockade ” as a justifiable measure. In
fact, of course, the Germans themselves from the very beginning of the war have
made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, and certainly in
Germany to-day there is no clear division between those whom the Government
is responsible for feeding and those whom it is not. The Germans cannot have
it both ways. If they consider themselves justified in destroying the lives and
property of civilians in towns and cities, and in killing merchant seamen, then
surely we must be at liberty to prevent cargoes of food-stuffs from entering
German-controlled ports.
fl
As regards the second accusation, the Germans have never succeeded in
making clear exactly why they regard the navicert system as an illegal measure
on Britain’s part. This is perhaps hardly surprising, since it is a method of
control which is compulsory only in the sense that neutrals who do not comply
with it may have to suffer whatever consequences we are in a position to enforce.
As far as neutrals are concerned, the argument apparently runs that by sub
mitting to it the neutrals are helping one belligerent, and thus neglecting their
duty of impartiality. The answer to this seems to be that the duties of neutrals
are defined by The Hague Conventions, in which there is nothing to forbid
neutrals submitting to such a measure of control as is provided by the navicert
system. No one has ever suggested that they would not just as willingly submit
to a German navicert system, if the Germans could produce one that was work
able, instead of sinking neutral ships without warning, or occupying neutral
territories. In any case, so far as neutrals are concerned, the advantages derive^
from the system by the British are merely incidental to the advantage game
by neutrals in not having to submit to contraband control on the high seas.
If these arguments are accepted, it follows that the main grounds relied
upon by the Germans to justify a retaliatory measure are totally inadequate.
2. Even if it were possible to justify a retaliatory measure, can this
particular measure be justified? The overriding principle governing all
reprisals the effect of which is not confined to the enemy is that the reprisals
must not inflict upon neutral States a degree of hardship and inconvenience
which is unreasonable in all the circumstances. The effect of the German
“ total blockade ” is to prohibit neutral ships from entering an enormous stretch
of sea round Britain (the area extends to about 500 miles west of Ireland, and
from the latitude of Bordeaux to that of the Faroe Islands), upon pain of having
their ships sunk without warning and their crews killed. As a matter of fact, at
least thirty-two neutral ships, exclusive of those sailing in British convoys, have
been sunk by enemy action since the declaration of the “ total blockade.” Details
are not available in most cases, but there can be little doubt that the majority
of these attacks were carried out without warning, and the death-roll is known
to be several hundreds. Thus, apart from the effect on neutral trade, the German
blockade inflicts upon neutral subjects a wholly disproportionate amount of
suffering.
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About this item

Content

The volume comprises reports and correspondence concerning: the dissemination of pro-British and Allied propaganda in Bahrain and the wider Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. region, as prepared and coordinated by the Publicity Office in Bahrain; the reception of anti-British propaganda in Bahrain, chiefly via radio broadcasts; the impact of both on local public opinion in Bahrain. The propaganda covers events in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East and the Far East, from the Norwegian campaign (April 1940) to the Japanese capture of the Dutch East Indies (March 1942). The volume’s principal correspondents are: the Publicity Officer in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (Roy Douglas Metcalfe; John Baron Howes; Bertram Thomas); the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Bahrain (Major Reginald George Evelin William Alban); the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Geoffrey Prior).

The volume includes:

Extent and format
1 volume (326 folios)
Arrangement

The volume’s contents are arranged in approximate chronological order, from the earliest item at the front to the latest at the end. The file notes at the end of the volume (ff 313-326) mirror the chronological arrangement.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the main foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the inside front cover with 1 and terminates at the back cover with 330; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional mixed foliation/pagination sequence is also present in parallel between ff 5-312; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled.

Pagination: the file notes at the back (ff 313-326) have been paginated using pencil.

Binding: The pages of a single letter were separated during the volume’s binding. The first page of this letter is at f 181, the remaining pages at ff 209-211.

Written in
English and Arabic in Latin and Arabic script
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‘File 28/7 I War: Propaganda: local opinion’ [‎224v] (453/664), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/2/687, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100025480742.0x000036> [accessed 24 April 2024]

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