‘File 28/7 I War: Propaganda: local opinion’ [‎226r] (456/664)

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S CONFIDENTIAL.
Copy No.
[W 2946/297/49]
3ssels, In
tod. Ii
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ENEMY ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING, SEPTEMBER 1,
1940-FEBRUARY 28, 1941.
ON the 30th January, 1941, Hitler proclaimed that “ every ship, with or
without convoy, which appears before our torpedo tubes is going to be torpedoed.”
i the face of it, this announcement appears to be uncompromising; and the
only qualification provided by the context is that the threats immediately
preceding it are specifically addressed to the peoples of the American Continent.
German commentators, however, subsequently tried to water it down by contending
that Hitler was referring only to ships which attempted to enter the area within
which the German “ total blockade ” is alleged to be in force.
From one point of view it probably matters little what exactly was Hitler’s
meaning, since the only conclusion that can be reached after a study of the facts
of enemy warfare on merchant shipping is that enemy action in this field is
never limited by Hie principles which are proclaimed by enemy spokesmen, but
solely by the opportunities (or lack of them) which exist at any given time. Thus,
as a previous paper on this subject has shown, the Germans, in utter disregard
not only of international law but also of their own rules as set out in their
Prize Ordinance, were regularly sinking merchant shipping, neutral as well as
Allied^ 1 ) in the wmters round Britain for at least ten months before the proclama
tion of their “ total blockade. Equally, as will be seen from this paper, now
that the “ total blockade ” has been proclaimed, they habitually make illegal
attacks on ships outside as well as inside its area. There can be little doubt,
indeed, that the frequency of such attacks is controlled by tactical and material
considerations, but certainly not by the fact that the Germans themselves have
chosen to limit the area of their blockade. Just as, at the beginning of the war,
the range of German attacks was to some extent controlled by the position of
their bases, and as it was extended by the acquisition of bases further west and
south, so it might be expected to extend in the future, even across the Atlantic,
if the Germans were to acquire suitable bases. One may perhaps discount Hitler s
announcement as a statement of immediate policy, for it is, in fact, a description
of what the Germans, so far as they were able, have already been doing almost
from the beginning of the war; but it is none the less worth remembering ^against
he background of the possibilities which might be developed in a German-
controlled future.
The German “ total blockade,” which was proclaimed on the 17th August,
1940, is not strictly a blockade at all. A blockade by definition must be effective,
that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access
to the enemy’s coast. Not even the Germans themselves can claim this for their
blockade of Britain. The G total blockade is, in fact, analogous with the Geiman
proclamations of February 1915 and January 1917. The former of these declared
the waters surrounding the United Kingdom a military area, in which all Allied
merchant vessels would be destroyed, irrespective of the safety of the lives of
passengers and crew, and in which neutral shipping would be exposed to similar
danger in view of the uncertainties of naval warfare; and the latter proclaimed
that all sea traffic would be prevented in certain prescribed zones round the Allied
coasts, and that neutral ships would navigate these zones at then own ns .
Similarly, the proclamation of the 1/th August, 1940, warned neutrals that all
waters round England had become an operations area, and that navigation m
this area consequently involved danger of destruction for neutrals, for whic t e
German Government disclaimed responsibility. Further, the Germans appeal
to base their claim to the right to enforce this measuie on the giound of their
(i) “ Allied ” in this paper includes British.
[15—37]