'File 8/15 Arab Series - 1933-1939' [‎42v] (84/434)

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7. On the 28th December Fuad Bey came to see me for the first time since
my return/ Our first subject of conversation was M. Maigret’s adventure. I
trotted out the same three rumours, with much the same comments as before, and
added a vague reference to suggestions that the French Government might be
prepared to give some kind of material assistance to Ibn Baud. Fuad Bey
expatiated on M. Maigret’& love of travel, his desire to write a book and his great
friendliness towards this country and Islam. He dealt systematically with my
collection of rumours. There was no present question, he said, of a Saudi
candidature for the Syrian Throne. There could be no such question so long as
the French were committed to a policy in Syria which turned out on its having a
republican constitution, and any modification of which would raise complicated
questions, among them that of securing the assent of the League of Nations. If
the Saudi Government reopened the question of the Hejaz Railway, as they had it
in their minds to do, they would approach His Majesty’s Government in the first
instance. All that had happened so far was that his own replies to interviewers
in Egypt had had a repercussion in Syi^a, where he had been asked many ques
tions and been led to engage in very general conversations of an informal kind.
He dismissed more briefly any idea of French intervention in the quarrel with the
Imam.
8. Fuad Bey went on to say that there was, none the less, a business side to
M. Maigret’s journey. After obtaining my promise that what he was about to
say would be regarded as highly confidential, he explained that when he was in
Paris with the Amir Feisal in the spring of last year, certain questions had been
broached. Conditions in Paris made it impossible to pursue them at that time.
The French had tried later to communicate with him at The Hague and Berlin,
but he was already in Moscow when they got into touch with him. Skipping a
long interval, he said that eventually the French Government had charged
M. Maigret to communicate their views on the desiderata put forward by the
Saudi mission last year. They related to war material, a loan and a mission to
help with military organisation and the Saudi air force. It had been decided to
invite M. Maigret to convey the French reply to the King at Riyadh.
9. Fuad Bey was much less precise as to the messages which my French
colleague had brought. His language generally, rather than any definite state
ment, implied that the negotiations were approaching a happy close. As I have
stated in my telegram under reference, he mentioned financiers, and not the
French Government, as the providers of the prospective loan, and he said that the
mission, though recruited under the auspices of the French Government, would
be of a civilian character.
10. Fuad Bey assured me more than once that these dealings with the
French implied no departure from his Government’s policy of friendship with His
Majesty’s Government. He reminded me lightly and amiably of their failure to
obtain from British sources the help they needed. I said that we could not
criticise the action of the Saudi Government in cultivating French friendship, and
begged him to believe that my desire for information was inspired by interest and
noVby jealousy. I did not comment otherwise on his statement, except for a
passing remark, when he mentioned the proposed military mission, that I thought
the Saudi Government had been looking to Turkey about a year ago for this kind
of assistance. Fuad Bey replied, with a slight and perhaps unintentional lapse
from strict accuracy, that there had only been a question of sending young men
to be trained in that country.
11. Assuming Fuad Bey’s explanation to have been generally in accordance
with the facts, and he was not only more precise but also more convincing than my
French colleague, it remains to be seen what advantages the French Government
expect in return for their benevolence. I have no means of obtaining information
on this subject. My general view is that there will be little reason for perturba
tion, even if the negotiations do in fact produce concrete results. Despite my
regard and admiration for Ibn Sand, I have still to discover that, in his dealings
with European Powers or commercial interests, he ever gives much that is solid or
of durable value for what he receives. I have never thought, for instance, that a
power providing an air force can hope for much of a “ cinch ” on the air of Saudi
Arabia.
12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty’s representative
in Paris and His Majesty’s consular officers at Beirut and Damascus.