'File 8/15 Arab Series - 1933-1939' [‎204r] (407/434)

partition scheme as an Arab and a Moslem, he objected to it also because
lie felt it would be ruinous to His Majesty’s Government and therefore
dangerous to himself. At one point he said he would rather that the British
mandate should last for another century. I employed the familiar argu
ments in favour of partition, especially the one which has always appealed
to me personally (provided that frontier less unfavourable to Arabs
than those suggested in the report of the Royal Commission could be found),
that a limitation by territory would be more stable and more likely to be
final than a limitation by population, but the King said that, on the contrary,
he believed that the creation of a separate Jewish State would be a perpetual
irritant and source of danger. But, indeed, he seemed unable to believe
that partition would ever be effected.
9. The King asked whether I had seen the reply which he had caused to
be given to the accusation that out of deference to the feelings of His
Majesty’s Government he had refused to allow an Arab conference to be
held in Mecca. I said that I had seen it in the Umm-al-Qura (see my des
patch No. 177, dated the 7th December), and that it seemed, if I might say
so, to have been drafted with His Majesty’s usual wisdom. Ibn Saud said
that in spite of the denial there was something in the report. It had been
suggested that there should be a secret conference about Palestine in Mecca,
but he had refused to allow it, alleging that Mecca was a place for religious
worship, not for political conferences. That was, in fact, one of his
reasons, but. of course, he had others; he never embarked upon any policy
until he was sure it was reasonable, and he did not wish to embarrass His
Majesty’s Government. And besides, if the holding of a conference had
been the course to pursue, he would have proposed it himself and not fol
lowed the suggestions of others.
10. Here the King revealed again a secondary anxiety, viz., that His
Majesty’s Government would come to some arrangement about Palestine with
someone else in the Arab world, or come to some fresh decision without his
knowledge, and thus damage his prestige irretrievably. There was, he
said, a story going about to which many were giving credence, that His
Majesty’s Government proposed to declare a cessation of Jewish immigra
tion into Palestine and to hand the country over to the Iraq Government,
who would then, as part of the bargain, open Palestine to unrestricted im
migration by Jews. He said that he had always been frank with His
Majesty’s Government, and he hoped they would always be frank with
him. T described the scheme he had mentioned as fantastic in itself and
incredible for two other reasons. In the first place partition was still the
declared policy of His Majesty’s Government, though, of course, no one could
foresee what the recommendations of the forthcoming commission would be,
and in the second, His Majesty’s Government appreciated the complete
frankness and sincerity with which His Majesty had always acted in the
matter of Palestine, and I was sure they would never take any serious deci
sion on the subject without giving him the earliest possible notice.
11. Ibn Saud said he wished that some policy could be found which
would not place His Majesty’s Government in opposition to the Arabs.
The one question of Palestine apart, the interests of His Majesty’s Govern
ment and the Arabs were identical, but the Arabs found themselves facing
the Jews, whom they could easily deal with as Jews alone, and behind the
Jews they found the British, and conflict was inevitable. The Arabs knew
well and execrated the treatment of the Arabs in Libya by the Italians both
before and after the war, and no one could have believed a year ago to what
extent Mussolini would induce the Arabs to look upon him as their cham
pion. His success was entirely due to the British policy in Palestine.
12. At the time of the interview I had not received the instructions con
veyed in your telegram No. 110, dated the 15th December, which arrived
after Ibn Saud had left Jedda, but, as will be seen from what I have said,
I anticipated your assurance that there was nothing fresh to say, and that,
if there was, he would be told as soon as possible. I also anticipated your