'Anglo-Russian Relations' [‎4r] (7/18)

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Amir so hostile as he is at present, we cannot hope for this, until after war
has broken out, but we can meanwhile extend our railway system to the
limits oi our frontier, and I cannot too strongly urge upon the Defence
Committee the supreme importance of taking this matter into their earnest
and earliest consideration.
“ The two extensions, one from Peshawar towards Dakka, on the road to
Jalalabad and Kabul, should be commenced as soon as possible, as the
section which lies between the Khyber Pass and the Kabul river runs
through a very difficult country, and must inevitably take a long time to
construct. It is also essential that there should be no delay in beginning
the broad gauge line from Khushalgarh through Kohat and Kurram to the
foot of the Pei war Kotal, for although the country is fairly easy, the distance
(152 miles) is longer.”
As regards the larger question of Russian aggression with which this
frontier railway problem must be closely connected, I do not think that the
bogey of a Russian invasion need affect its elucidation. I am one of those
who maintain that though an invasion of India by Russia from her present
bases is a possible, though lengthy, operation, it is nevertheless an extremely
improbable one. In saying this, I have of course, borne fully in mind the
changes in the general situation brought about by recent events. The
Russians themselves now affect to scout the invasion theory, and I think
with some honesty. I am perfectly prepared therefore to put on one side
any possible danger of such an event occurring within a period of several
a ears to come. I leei, too, that I need not enlarge here on the ever present
possibility of European complications, capable of reacting on our position
in the Middle East, since such contingencies will doubtless occur to von.
There are, however, other dangers which we must take into most serious
consideration. There can be little doubt, for instance, that the victories of
Japan over Russia have brought about so great a diminution of the latter’s
prestige throughout Asia as to constitute a potential menace to the
continuance of peace, which it would be rash entirely to ignore. As a ease
in point I may cite the undoubted change which has taken place in the
attitude of the Amir and Afghans generally towards Russia, a change
assuredly due to the diminished prestige of the latter Power, 'the over
weening v anity of Habibullah and his entourage was sufficiently shown
during the residence of the recent Mission in Kabul, and I think L danger
that we must ever hear in mind is that the Amir may, and not improbably
will, treat Prussia in the future with less consideration than hitherto.
We can afford to, and do, put up with scant courtesy at times from
Kabul, if only to keep the peace, but it is a matter for consideration, whether
Russia, with her shaken prestige in Central Asia, could be relied on tamely
to swallow the affronts to which we sometimes submit.
Tiiere is, I think, always danger of an incident arising on the Russo-
Afghan border which might lead to very awkward situations.
If Russia were to quarrel with the Amir we should have either to
support the Amir, in accordance with the terms of our Treaty, if he was
right, or coerce him ourselves if he were wrong, assuming, of course, that
the resources of diplomacy had tailed to effect a peaceable solution. This
latter course of action might, and very possibly w^ould, lead to a state of
anarchy in Afghanistan. In such circumstances much would depend on
our general state of prepare 1 ness at the time, as a safeguard agaisnt further