'Anglo-Russian Relations' [‎3v] (6/18)

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complications which might conceivably result in the partition of
Afghanistan.
If on the other hand, Russia, through motives of pure aggression, were to
advance into Afghanistan, then I am decidedly of opinion that it would be
necessary to treat such an advance as a casus belli. This would be essential
both from the point of view of our treaty obligations and from that of our
material interests. If we did not adopt such a course we should practically
have renounced all further right to any special position in Afghanistan, the
first and essential line of defence for India, and both Amir and people
would hasten to make terms with what was obviously the stronger Power.
I need hardly point out how, in sucli circumstances, our position in this
country would be shaken. All these are points which I think are
thoroughly appreciated by all those who have studied the subject, and I am
sure that in writing to you it is unnecessary to enter into them at length.
What is, however, less appreciated, is how impotent we are under existing
conditions, either adequately to defend the Amir against Russia, or even to
coerce him ourselves, should this necessary railway construction be
abandoned.
I am afraid I cannot follow the view that this reversal of a railway
policy which we, in common with His Majesty’s Government, have been
consistently following for the last few years, would tend to increase the
friendship of either the Amir or the tribes towards us. On the contrary, I
cannot help thinking that so hurried and remarkable a volte-face, however
much it might be welcomed by our enemies, would be deplored by all those
sections who are at present friendly to us. and would tend only to strengthen
the disbelief in our power,—amounting almost to contempt,—now affected
certainly by the Amir, and to a less extent possibly by the tribesmen. Ibis
feeling I regard as one of the greatest dangers to the preservation of peace
on and beyond our frontier, and anything which would tend, even remotely,
to increase it, I should consider as much to be deplored.
I think that, should we now abandon our railway policy, the immediate
result would he that we should find the Amir more “ difficile ” than ever
whilst the tribesmen would not improbably he emboldened by what they
could only regard as an exhibition of extraordinary weakness on our part.
I think that on most, if not all, these points, we are in substantial
agreement, and that you appreciate, as I do, that the increased, and ever-
increasing, efficiency of armament of the tribes is an argument in favour of
the most complete preparedness on our part. I am, as you know, opposed
on principle to aggressive measures against the tribes, but I recognise that^
however humble may be our attitude towards them, they will continue to
constitute a serious and ever-present danger, against which we ought always
to be thoroughly prepared ; and, apart from more Imperial considerations,
I can conceive of no better guarantee of continued peace on the frontier
than the making of two such railways as are now on our programme, which
will enable us to dominate on three sides the most formidable and important
section of the whole borderland, and will, at the same time, provide them
with those increased facilities for trade which have hitherto invariably
proved a great civilising factor amongst the Rathans.
When, in addition to the more formidable power of the tribes, it is
recollected that the Amir is now carrying out an enormous increase in his
armaments, you will, l think, agree that a combination of tribesmen and