'From Captain the Honourable G. C. Napier, on Special Duty in Persia, to the Political Secretary, India Office, Westminster, dated London, 30th July 1879' [‎130r] (9/12)

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in the fullest manner the position of a British Officer in the eyes of the
people on both sides of the border.
As regards the Turkomans, it was absolutely necessary that I should
be able to show that I could command the aid and respect of the Persian
authorities.
On any other terms I should be incurring additional obligations,
which I knew I had not the means of repaying. They would, as I
aftewards found, have been still anxious to receive me, but on the faith
of assistance in their difficulties that I should not have been in a position
to give.
With this object in view, therefore, I asked for the appointment of a
Persian officer to accompany me on my tour, and proposed to the Prince
Governor to send Abul Hassan Khan, who was a personal friend of
mine, the son of a border Chief, and connected with the Akhal Turko
mans by marriage.
His appointment would have so far secured the success of my journey,
and would have given it such great political importance in the eyes of
the people along the whole line of frontier, and would have gone so far
towards completing the pacification of the Atak, that I knew great
opposition would be offered to it by the Itussian faction at Teheran, and
that nothing but the sanction of the Shah, who was then in Europe, and
to whom I suggested a reference, would decide the question in my
favour. It was ultimately decided against me by the brother of the
Eoreign Minister, who was notoriously a Itussian partisan.
Prom that time it was clear to the local Government that Itussian
influence was in the ascendant at the capital, and I could count on
gaining no point that was likely to be contested by the Itussian
Minister.
A nominal concession was made in the appointment of a brother of
one of the border Chiefs to accompany me, but he from the outset
declared that he could not cross the border, and acted always under
compulsion.
Notwithstanding this discouragement, so long as the intentions of the
Itussian authorities remained uncertain, there was room to hope that
I might turn my presence on the border to good account. The delay in
advancing from the coast, and the secrecy maintained regarding their
designs by the Russians, seemed to indicate that their plans were still
undeveloped, and were dependent on the turn affairs would take in
Europe. There the political situation seemed to be favourable to any
pacific arrangement. Peace was about to be secured at Berlin, and the
Shah was actually in England, or expected there.
I had still no knowledge of the state of our relations with the Shah’s
Government, but it was reasonable to suppose, under the circumstances,
that both Russia and Persia might be willing to accept a solution of
a long standing frontier difficulty that neither could object to, save in
view of a common policy of aggression.
The difficulty that would certainly be made a serious ground of
objection would be that of pacifying the Turkomans without a cam
paign. It might, even at a distance, appear insuperable. But I found
that the delay in the Russian advance had in no way increased the
warlike spirit of the tribe. I had excellent information through the
Kuchan borderers, and knew that the elders still looked to an asylum in
Persia, maintained their full influence, and might be depended upon to
keep to any engagements made for them.
On the 19th of July, therefore, I submitted a suggestion for the
appointment of Persian officers (or of myself in conjunction with one of
the border Chiefs) to be commissioned to visit the Atak, with the object
of restraining the tribe from attacking any of the Russian camps, and
paving the way to a settlement of the complaints against them. My
own presence, though useful in conveying to the Turkomans a pledge of
the sincerity of the Persian Government, would not be indispensable,
2884. C