'File 12/1 [1 A/1 I] Persian Claims to Bahrain' [‎31v] (67/502)

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§SH ' r '’
the authority of or reference to Government. The treaty
into which he had entered was immediately officially dis
avowed, and the Persian Government so informed, and
Captain Bruce, as a sign of disapproval of his action, was
removed from his appointment. The Persian Government
on their side equally disapproved the action of the Prince
Governor of Pars in entering into any treaty discussions
' without the prior approval of the Shah. [The Persian
Government were reminded of this in 1825, 1845, 1866,
1907, 1928 and 1929.] It appears impossible in these circum
stances to base any legitimate claim to Persian sovereignty
over Bahrein on the provisions of the Treaty of 1822.
(4) The Gold Coin alleged to have been struck at
Bahrein in 1817.
Please see paragraph 47 above.
A Persian Mission appears to have visited Bahrein in
1816 or 1817 (paragraph 9 above) and it is conceivable that
a coin might have been struck on that occasion. On the
other hand, it would probably be extremely difficult to
prove that the coin had not in fact been struck elsewhere,
though with an indication that it had been minted at
Bahrein. The incident is in itself of relatively small
importance, and it would, it is suggested, be impossible
for Persia to use such an incident, even if it could be
proved, save in support of arguments of much more sub
stantial character.
(5) Payment of Peeshhesh, Offerings or Tribute at various
Stages by Bahrein to Persia.
From paragraph 6 above it will be seen that tribute
appears to have been paid by Bahrein to Persia in 1799.
The rulers of Bahrein may also have offered to pay
tribute in 1839 (paragraph 32) and appear to have
offered to do so in 1860 (paragraph 67). In assessing
the importance of the payment of tribute in 1799, or,
if it then took place, in 1839 or 1860, it is relevant that
such payment or promise of payment was immediately
followed by the submission of the riders of Bahrein, in
1800 to Muscat, in 1839 to.the Egyptians, and in 1860
to the Turks. In estimating the importance of such
payments as evidence of a recognition of Persian suzerainty,
the arguments advanced by Her Majesty’s Minister at Tehran
in his Despatch No. ’28 of March 1815, in which Colonel
Sheil remarks that the Chiefs of Bahrein “ had in all
probability from time to time given peeshkesh, offerings, or
tribute to Persia as a mark of superiority, as Kandahar and
Herat still continue to do, without an acknowledgment of
subjection and the comment thereon of the Secret Com
mittee of the East India Company that “presents and
complimentary messages do not imply an acknowledgment
of sovereignty, and they have not been confined to Persia ”
are also relevant.
(6) Flying of the Persian Flag by the Sheikh of Bahrein.
(a) The Persian flag was hoisted by the Sheikh of
Bahrein in 1860. But as will be seen from paragraph 67
above, hardly had it been hoisted when, on the arrival of
a Turkish emissary, it was lowered and the Turkish flao-
hoisted in its place. At a later stage in 1860-61 the Persian
and Turkish flags were apparently flown side by side by the
Sheikh. It appears difficult in these circumstances to base
any substantial argument on the incident.
(b) The Notes addressed by the Persian envoy in London
to the Foreign Office in February 1869 alleged that the
Persian flag had been hoisted by Sheikh Md. bin Khalifah
and that the Resident had in September 1868 bombarded the