File 160/1903 'Persian Gulf: El Katr; appointment of Turkish Mudirs; question of Protectorate Treaty with El Katr' [‎10v] (25/860)

den 'd whether even the modified proposals of the Government of India
cor e squared with the status quo. As a compromise the Government of
Ind 4 ^p roposed the revival of an agreement of 1868 made with a former
ShejJ 1 hut the Foreign Office (18th February 1905), thought that this would
he i’ ; ' ‘tive, and the matter was reserved for consideration by the Defence
Corn? 5 ur e along with the whole question of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . It is not
known jether it was so considered, and it has not been heard of since,
until Six’ G. Lowther’s Despatch of 22nd August, from w r hich quotation has
already been made, and the Foreign Office letter of 4th October, in which the
views of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. were asked for.
We have in the present telegram the views of Lieutenant-Colonel Cox
and the Government of India. They are as follows :—
(Colonel Cox)
“I consider that it would be useless now to mak* treaty with Bin Thani,
unless w*' are prepared to do so openly, and to briny about elimination
of Turkish influence of Katr, as suggested in second item above.
Without such simultaneous action existence of treaty would only be
source of danger to the Thani family from the present Turkish regime,
and they ivould themselves fight shy of it.
(Government of India) :—
“ We concur with Cox that no advantage ivould accrue from treaties with
Katr Chiefs, and further that Chiefs would probably not now agree to
enter into treaties, unless the Turks can be induced to confine
themselves to their recognised possessions at Katif and UjairT
It will be observed that in 1904, when the local situation was ripe,
Constantinople was not ready; and that now, when Constantinople is ready,
the local situation is not ripe. Sir G. Lowther in his despatch of 22nd August
savs that “ the time may not be far distant when, as advocated by Lord
“ Lansdowne in February 1905, a comprehensive, as opposed to piecemeal,
“ treatment of outstanding questions in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . . . may
“ become imperative.” The nearest approach that has been made to
anything comprehensive was Sir E. Grey’s Despatch of 17th October, the
fate of whiefy has been described. If the settlement is to be friendly there
must be some give and take. As to this Colonel Cox’s view is : —
“ Whether achievement of above ends is possible by means of comprehensive
reciprocal compromise, or whether coercive measures will be necessary,
is a question beyond my purview, but I beg to say that I can conceive
no quid pro quo which we coidd offer Porte in this sphere in exchange
for withdrawal of her pretensions. It could perhaps be found in some
other sphereT
This will presumably be accepted. The only points of contact that we
have with Turkey in the neighbourhood of the Gulf are things that both of
us want and neither can afford to part with.
“ Should coercive measures (Colonel Cox says) be necessary, ice can never
expect the recurrence of such a. favourable junction locally as exists at
present. The numerical strength of military posts in question has just
been reduced to a minimum under Nazim Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. 's scheme for concen
trating troops at Bagdad; while we have, strong squadron in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. in connection with Arms Traffic, which would make naval
demonstration simple matter."
The Foreign Office, as has been mentioned above, have already contem
plated resort to force in the case of the mudirates in Katr, with the result—
not uncommon in such cases—that it was proposed that India should perform
the task. If troops are to be employed, it is perhaps natural that they should
be Indian troops. But their employment would probably come within the
scope of 21 & 22 Viet. c. 106, s. 55 : “ Except for preventing or repelling
“ actual invasion of Her Majesty’s Indian possessions, or under other sudden
“ and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent
“ of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any
“ military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such
“ possessions by Her Majesty’s forces charged upon such revenues.” It is