File 619/1907 Pt 9 'Arms traffic:- Persian Gulf:- Military operations.' [‎10r] (15/94)

From Viceroy, 9th May 1911.
Foreign Secret. Mekran arms traffic. Admiral offers following ex^
planation:—
“ Barkat Khan is the head and front of arms traffic in Persian Baluchistan.
It is he who invited Afghans to come down this year, and it was reported
that he was boasting that they were coming from Fanoch in large numbers
to assist him. His sole object in raiding loyal villages is to force them to
give him and the^Afghans active assistance, as without this assistance of
coast villages it is impossible to make certain of getting a cargo away even
when it has reached the coast. Mir of Kambar and Mir of Haji, who were
placed in charge of Biyaban coast at our suggestion, and who have been
loyally abstaining from helping arms runners, complained that Barkat had
looted on a large scale lately amongst their followers, and had killed some of
their men. Representatives of villages looted also came into Jask to report
that Barkat had used violence, and told them that the friends of Sircar
would be looted, while those who followed Barkat would not be molested.
It was known that Afghans were with Barkat during these raids and many
more were said to have joined him afterwards.
“ The Governor of the coast ports admitted to Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. 1n Persian
Gulf recently in connection with these operations that he had no force or
means to act against Barkat. It is, in fact, notorious that the Persian
Government are powerless in these regions, and if action had not been taken
by ns we could no longer have counted on assistance of any of the coast
peoples in regard to suppression of arms traffic, and the situation in the
Biyaban district would have become exceedingly difficult. Probably Barkat
would have said that he had driven us off, and his prestige with the Afghans
would have increased enormously.
I he Biyaban is the easiest coast on which to run arms during the
south west monsoon. It is almost impossible to do so on the Mekran coast
during that season except on rare occasions : the Biyaban coast is also the
most difficult to guard, as it is only 30 miles from Oman coast, and dhows
can easily slip across and land arms if they are certain of a friendly reception
on the other side.^ It is therefore of the utmost importance, as stated in my
telegram of the 27th February, No. 16, to maintain active co-operation with
coast villages and Mirs, unless we are prepared to continue blockade on a
costly scale for an indefinite period. If Barkat’s power over them is broken,
then it will lie possible shortl} 7 to make a considerable reduction in expenses.
“ Under these circumstances I considered it advisable to order movements
in question, as they have a greater bearing on the issue of operations for
the suppression of traffic in arms than the capture of a cargo of arms and
ammunition.
“ r i he troops were already under orders to re-embark when I received
Government of India s telegram under reply. The ostensible reason for the
expedition, however, was to recapture a cargo of arms wrecked on the Biyaban
coast about a fortnight previously from a Koweit dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. , some of which had
been taken b\ the natives. Of these about half have been recovered by
expeditionary force.”
y Admiral’s telegram 16 was forwarded with Foreign Secretary’s letter No
9 M, dated 2nd March.
. 1 trust > in the circumstances of case, the Admiral’s action may not be
judged from a too strict interpretation of his instructions.