File 619/1907 Pt 6 'Arms traffic:- Persian Gulf - Searching of vessels in territorial waters of Trucial Chiefs. Position of Katr [Qatar].' [‎272r] (83/124)

• Vide correspondence ending with Foreign
Department endorsementf No 987 E.-A., dated the
26th May 1911.
■j - Serial No. 167, Part VIII.
20
No. 1660, dated Bushire, the 25th Jane (received 8rd July) 1911 (Confidential).
From— Lieutenant-Colonel P. Z. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.
1 have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of
India, a copy of a letter received from the
No. C.- 40 , dated the 21 st June 1911. Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Kuwait, in which he
voices a report, persistently current in Kuwait, to the effect that Doha and
Wakra, in Katar, are now regular arms depots.
2 Experience has taught me to treat with reserve the reports emanating
from ihe bazaar of one Gulf port regarding the ill-behaviour of another, but
in this case we have a good deal of circumstantial evidence in corroboration.
Eirstly, the evident attention being paid of late by Goguyer and the
Maskat gang to Katar, instanced by the case of the dhow A term adopted by British officials to refer to local sailing vessels in the western Indian Ocean. “ hateh-el-Khair
MaS S S and, secondly, by repeated reports reaching
me from the Customs authorities and
others here regarding the present brisk
ness of the arms smuggling industry in
the Tangistan ports. This accumula
tive evidence leads me to think that Captain Shakespear’s information is
probably w r ell founded.
It will be seen from paragraph lojf ^
x Serial No. 163, Part vin. i 0 th May, to the Government of India,
that reports in a similar sense have also been reaching His Excellency.
3 The general question of our relations with the Porte in regard to
various problems affecting both Powers in the Gulf region mcluaing the
status of Katar, has been so specifically “ sub judice ” lately that I ^ve hesitated
to put forward any new suggestions in regard to items affected, but the p
reports inevitably direct lively attention to the two weak links m the chain of
arms prohibitions, represented by the Katar Peninsula and the un-earmarked
coast-line south of Ojair, to which Bin Saood has access.
4 If there is no likelihood of our arriving in the near future at a give-
and-take adjustments of interests with the Porte, 1 am inclined to think it might
be possible, without introducing any political questions at all or involving the
Katar familv in difficulties with the Turks, to get them, in return for a small
subsidy to notify to their dependents and the public, a prohibition against the
import of arms by sea, and to undertake, in case of the supply of their own re
quirements, to import only in communication with our representative at Bahrain.
The prohibition might not, it is true, be rigidly enforced by the Katar
Shaikh, but the mere fact of its existence would eliminate one of the present
loopholes, of which Messrs. Goguyer and others are now seeking to take
advantage; for all arms under export to the Katar coast would then be con-
traband. ,
5 I do not forget that we should still be left with the one remaining
weak 'link—the strip of coast south of Ojair, to which Bin Saood has access
but assuming the political impracticability at present of asking Bin Saood to
issue a similar prohibition to his dependents, the status of that strip of coast
seems sufficiently uncertain and nndefinable to make it possible for us to treat
it as coast covered either by the prohibition of Bahrain or that of Katar.
There would then be no hiatus throughout the perimeter of the Gulf, and
any consignment leaving Maskat, uncovered by a pass, would be seizable at
si/ht as contraband, and the difficulty which at present exists of dealing with
duows under the Trench flag landing arms on the Katar coast, would then be
greatly diminished.
6. It is worth noting that in practice the Katar Shaikhs tacitly rec °g"
nize and make no attempt to question our right to seize arms under ® S P°‘ .
their coast, and it is only vis a vis the Trench Government and the public
that our action has no basis of authority.