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File 2764/1904 Pt 2 'Baghdad Railway: General negotiations 1908-10.' [‎218r] (444/799)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (391 folios). It was created in 1908-1910. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government]
department.
\\y ill
ASIATIC TURKEY AND A RABIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
'[38405]
/
[October 28.]
Section 2.
(No.
Sir,
266.
i sir tj
Secret -) ^.4wf
No. 1.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir PV. Goschen.
Foreign Office, October 28, 1909.
I ASKED Count Metternich to come to see me to-day.
irritation ^°T e ^ ° M the Ba g dad Kailway as one of the
tilings icii caused irritation. I would therefore take this opportunity of explaining
e^t v ^ 4 per Cent 'Turkish P cu S tomf
duties witnout a promise that the additional revenue would not be used for thp TWrlnrl
Railway. About one-third of the increase of the duties would fa f on B his! fot
merce, and this m itself would be much disliked. But, if the money thus secured “t
he expense of British trade was to be used to make a new through-route to the East and
to establish means of communication which would superseded! others in carndng
trade from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. into Mesopotamia, and all this under the exclusive control
of one foreign Power, then the position of a British Government which had agreed to
this would become untenable. It was therefore impossible for us to agree to the
increase of the Turkish customs duties unless we had proper safeguards against
the use, of the additional revenue for the purpose of displacing British trade in
Mesopotamia. VV e felt that we must either have a part in the Bagdad Railwav itself
or else we must have a concession which would enable us to establish other means of
communication by which we couhl trade with Mesopotamia on equal terms.
With regard to the participation of France and Russia in the Bagdad Railway
new that Count Metternich had objected to a discussion d quatre, because such a
discussion would put Germany in a minority. But I explained to him that this
had^ not been our object in proposing the discussion. French financiers had already
an interest m the project before I came into office, and it was certainly not I who
had brought them in. As regards Russia, the position was this. We had on
previous occasions been instrumental, or been supposed to be instrumental, in
efeatmg the Russian plans for securing outlets on the sea, first in the case
of the Mediterranean, and then in the case of the Far East; this had caused
much ill-wdl m Russia towards us. Now we had succeeded in overcoming
t us ill-will, and I was very anxious not to revive it as regards the one remaining
outlet which Russia was thought to desire—the Persian Gulf—by participating in the
Bagdad Railway, when Russia was opposed to it and excluded from it. I had told
the Russian Government more than once that I thought they ought not to oppose, in
principle, the construction of the Bagdad Railway, but ought instead to make up their
mmds as to the terms on which they could join in the project. I did not think it
would be impossible for the German Government to overcome this difficulty of Russian
opposition ; indeed, I knew that before the visit of the German Emperor to this
country Herr von Schoen had spoken to the Russian Government on the subject.
I told Count Metternich that my object in giving these explanations to the German
Government was to prove to them that our action was not dictated by ill-will to
Germany, but by the necessities of the case, and that the attitude we were obliged to
take up with regard to the increase of the Turkish customs duties was not an attitude
taken up behind the back of the German Government in a way to cause irritation and
introduce friction into what w T e hoped would be a friendly discussion.
Count Metternich replied that there would be no objection to British financial
co-operation in the Bagdad Railway, but Germany must have the control; in the sense
of having a majority on whatever Railway Board controlled the line. He asked me
whether we should be satisfied with some measure of control on the southern section of
the railway.
I told him it was the southern part that interested us principally.
He asked how much we meant by the southern section, because he thought that
the part of the line that went through Mesopotanua would probably prove to be the
most valuable part of the wdiole line.
I replied that this was a question for experts at a later stage in the discussion.
Count Metternich observed that the Bagdad Railway did not, as it was at present
[2460 ee—2]
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About this item

Content

The volume comprises telegrams, despatches, correspondence, memoranda, newspaper cuttings, maps and notes, relating to negotiations over the proposed Berlin to Baghdad Railway in the period 1903-1907.

The discussion in the volume relates to the economic, commercial, political and military considerations impinging on British strategy for the international negotiations over the development of a railway to Baghdad in particular.

Further discussion surrounds the motivations and strategies of British competitors in the area; included in the volume are four maps.

The principal correspondents in the volume include the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Lansdowne, Sir Edward Grey), His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople (Sir Nicholas O'Connor), the Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles Hardinge, Sir Thomas Henry Sanderson), and for India (Earl Percy, Sir Arthur Godley), the Viceroy of India (Lord Curzon of Keddleston), the Secretary to the Political and Secret Department of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. (Sir Richmond Richie) and the London Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia (George Newell).

Extent and format
1 volume (391 folios)
Arrangement

The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the rear to the front of the volume.

The subject 2764 (Bagdad Railway) consists of five volumes, IOR/L/PS/10/56-60. The volumes are divided into five parts with each part comprising one volume.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the main foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the first folio with 1 and terminates at the inside back cover with 392; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is also present in parallel between ff 329-358; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled, and are located in the same position as the main sequence. A previous foliation sequence, which is also circled, has been superseded and therefore crossed out. The foliation sequence does not include the front cover.

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File 2764/1904 Pt 2 'Baghdad Railway: General negotiations 1908-10.' [‎218r] (444/799), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/57, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100026492733.0x00002d> [accessed 28 March 2024]

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