File 2764/1904 Pt 2 'Baghdad Railway: General negotiations 1908-10.' [‎284r] (580/799)

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and Persia, already passes tlirough the country, and it seems to be well established that
the present traffic facilities are totally inadequate ; and finally, there is a fully-developed
trade organisation ready to take full and immediate advantage of the economic
expansion which is likely to follow upon the execution of the irrigation schemes, the
improvement of agricultural methods, and administrative reforms. The value of the
imports into Bagdad from Europe amounted in 1907 to 1,784,9811, and from India,
China, and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to 527,399/.; the value of the exports to Europe and
America amounted to 557,085/., and to India and China to 153,203/. In addition to
this there were large shipments of grain by native craft, of which no details are
available.
So far as construction is concerned, neither of the Gulf schemes presents any
engineering difficulties, and accordingly, in view of the economic conditions and
possibilities of the Bussorah-Bagdad region, there seems no reason to doubt that a
railway there would speedily become remunerative, if it were not so from the first.
Whether tw’o competing railways would be likely to be financially successful, and if
not, which of the two alternative schemes it would be desirable to adopt, are questions
which will be considered later.
lurning now to the proposed Mediterranean route, it must be pointed out that the
proposal is far from being a new one, that no new facts have so far been advanced in
its support, and that it rests largely upon anticipations as to future possibilities,
instead of upon present conditions.
(a.) Almost from the very commencement of railway enterprise the possibility of
the construction of a railway from Alexandretta along the Euphrates valley was con
templated, mainly as an overland route to India. Various surveys were made, and
finally, as Major Ramsay has pointed out, the matter wuis considered very fully in 1871,
after the opening of the Suez Canal, by a Committee of the House of Commons, which
took voluminous evidence, and received also, through the Foreign Office, a number of
reports from consular officers and others acquainted with the country. The Committee
considered an alternative proposal for a line to follow a route closely resembling that
of the present Bagdad Railway concession. Though they reported in favour of the
Euphrates Valley line, it is not apparent that, as Major Ramsay appears to suppose,
they had any great confidence in the commercial possibilities of the scheme; they
favoured it because it would be considerably the shorter and cheaper to construct, and
afford quicker passage for persons, troops, or mails, but they expressly stated that the
Tigris route might attract the larger amount of traffic. General Chesney, who had
long before surveyed the route, expressed the opinion that heavy goods would continue
to go (to India) by the canal, “ leaving the light valuable goods, mails, passengers,
troops, and treasure to go by rail.” The decision of the Committee seems to have been
determined largely by strategical considerations.
In the early discussions of routes for the present Bagdad Railway concession the
Germans made a preliminary survey of the Euphrates Valley route, but abandoned the
idea of utilising it.
(/>.) The evidence given before the Committee of 1871 showed that from Meskene,
where the proposed line would strike the Euphrates, to Hit, which is the head of the
fertile districts, the course of the river is through a valley of a few miles in width,
with a slight alluvial deposit, and fairly generally cultivated ; beyond that there is on
both sides arid prairie, which is covered in the spring months with a prolific growth of
rank grasses. In 1871 it was stated that the prairie undulates greatly, and at every
few miles forms gaps or wide ravines, which are flooded in the rainy season.,. There
are scarcely any towns of any degree of importance, and the country as a whole is
very sparsely populated. There is a considerable amount of sheep-rearing under
difficulties. Between Aleppo and the Euphrates there is a gently undulating plain,
mostly devoid of trees and with swampy valleys.
Major Ramsay quotes, in Appendix No. 1 to his despatch, some opinions as to the
prospects of the railway, only one of which (that of Sir Henry Rawlinson) is antagonistic.
He does not, however, refer to the Consular opinions collected by the Foreign Office,
and a reference to these shows that there was a much stronger body of hostile opinion
(represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, Consul-General at Bagdad, Mr. Consul
Holmes, Mr. Vice-Consul Rassam at Mosul, Mr. W. G. Palgrave, Mr. Consul-General
Wood, and Mr. Consul Taylor) than would appear from the list of opinions cited by
Major Ramsay. There was, in fact, a very marked divergence of opinion. It should
be stated, however, that some of the advocates of the line, ^ including members of
Sir George Chesney’s mission, based their case upon the possibility of reclaiming land,,
developing agriculture, and creating a population, and also upon the establishment and
maintenance of order.
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