'Bunder Abbas – Kerman Railway' [‎14r] (1/2)

C. 153
Th is Document is the property o f the Secretary of Stcde for India .
SECRET,
BENDER ABBAS-KERMAN RAILWAY.
Memorandum by Lord Ourzon.
1 . 1 have purposely kept back these papers for a little, because, just as I
was beginning to note, there came along a file with a Nushki-Seistan Kailway
scheme, and it seemed desirable to place the two projects in relation to each
other, though each can fairly be considered on its own merits.
2. The war seems likely to have two results in the Middle East:—(1) the
supersession of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 by some new
arrangement, more in consonance with British interests and with the needs
of the time; ( 2 ) the enlargement of the.British sphere, as hitherto defined,
by the inclusion in it, whether formal or informal, of much of the present
neutral zone. Any such rearrangement will amount to partition in a veiled
form, and, whatever we do, it will [)e interpreted by Russia as giving her
a right to consolidate her influence in the Russian sphere in a manner that
will fall little short of a Protectorate. One of the instruments of this policy
will be the construction of a number of railways in the North, designed in
the political, commercial, and strategical interest of Russia, and intended
to rivet her hold upon the Northern Provinces, (a) I believe that a Russian
railway has already been opened to Tabriz ; ( 6 ) a line from Baku via Resht
to Teheran will follow, and has already been applied for ; (c) railway
connection will be established (from Askabad or elsewhere) with Meshed.
Of these schemes the second is the most important. We cannot stop it,
though I hope we shall not find any part of the money or treat it as part of
a Trans-Persian scheme—a project to which I trust that we shall give less
countenance than we did before the war. ^ . . . *
3 . Railway communication between Europe and India is likely in the
long run to come. But what will be, or ought to be, the geographical line
adopted is still uncertain. It may be via Persia, it may ultimately be
through Afghanistan ; whichever it be, we ought not, in my opinion, to go
out of our way to encourage the connection. It can add nothing to the
advantages, and may add a great deal to the risk of our position in India.
The Trans-Persian scheme, with which the late Government coquetted, and
to which they went perilously near to committing His Majesty’s Government,
is for the time being in abeyance. I trust that nothing may be done from
this end to revive it. W hen the Russians have consolidated their politic id
and military position in Northern Persia, they will want to push railways
from Teheran to Ispahan, and from Teheran to Yezd or even Kerman. But
that will not be for many years, and in the meantime we should, in my
judgment, abstain from compromising ourselves on these larger and
speculative issues. .. .
4 The question of applying for a Bunder A bbas-Kerman railway rails into
a different category and is recommended in these papers as a form of reply to
a proposed Russian concession in the North. It should be looked at from
several points of view. . . . , . a
5 I ;un unable to gather from the papers what has happened to the
Mohammera-Khoremabad project, which has hitherto held the field as the
British reply in the South to any Russian railroad advance m the North,
but I infer that the surveys are held in abeyance because of the disturbed
state of the country since the outbreak of war. 1 have never been very
enthusiastic about this railway, because (a) the physical ddhculties when
it enters the mountains will be great, (/>) it seems to me to enter I ersia
from the wrong direction, (c) it can only be effective or successful if it
forms a part of a scheme for bringing South-West Persia under British
influence, a scheme which seems tome to have become much more difficult
from the moment when Ispahan was most unhappily included m the Russian
sphere.
S 322 50—8/16