'Bunder Abbas – Kerman Railway' [‎14v] (2/2)

0. On the other hand, if, as the result of the present war, we are to push
onto and to hold Baghdad, and to consolidate our position in South-West
Persia—in connection with the oil wells or for other reasons—then such a
railway, or at any rate the earlier sections of it, may become inevitable, and
it should not be dropped.
7. These remarks are pertinent, because I see from Mr. Orreenway s letter
that it is the same syndicate which has hitherto held the Mohammera
concession that is now interested in the Bunder Abbas-Xerman project, and
that one of the conditions of proceeding with the latter is that the syndicate
should be reimbursed the 100,000L which they have already spent on surveys
for the former.
8. This seems to me a very unsatisfactory position; /or (1) it indicates a
lack of policy which is hardly to be admired ; (2) it implies that we can
only get one railway by dropping the other. Why should this be the case ?
And if it be the case, surely there ought to be a careful balance of the merits
of the two before a decision in favour of one or the other is arrived at. I can
find no trace of such a discussion in these papers.
9. Passing to the Bunder Abbas-Kerman project on its own merits, I am
not clear whether it is now advocated merely as a diplomatic rejoinder to a
Russian concession from Baku to Teheran, or as a commercial proposition,
or as a strategic move, intended in the last resort to bar the completion of
a Turco-Persian line, either in the direction of Nushki or to some Gulf port
to the east of Bunder Abbas, such as Ohahbar.
10. If it is put forward merely as a diplomatic rejoinder not intended to
materialise at the present time, it is obviously only a piece of make-believe,
with no value except the latent rights of revival which might be inherent in
it, and which might have a positive value one day in the future.
11. If, on the other hand, the line possesses a commercial value such as will
justify its construction as a business proposition, this ought to be demonstrated
by the figures of trade. 1 cannot recall having seen it done. Moreover, its
commercial effect has to be considered upon a possible future extension of
the Nushki Railway beyond Dalbandin, for both lines would then be
competing for the trade of East Persia and Khorasan, with a probable
decided advantage (owing to the existence of a maritime base at Bunder
Abbas) to the Kerman line.
12. If, thirdly, the line is to be viewed strategically, it possesses the
unquestionable advantage of diverting the Russian spearhead the
Teheran-Yezd-Kerman railway of the future) at a spot where it would be
pointed straight towards India, and twisting it round in a direction where
the prolongation would be under British control, and in the last resort, at
Bunder Abbas, under the guns of the British Fleet From this point of
view it might be an advantage to Great Britain to anticipate the future
by the construction of such a line.
13. There is the secondary strategical advantage, assuming the entire east
ol 1 ersia to fall ultimately, as seems inevitable, under British protection, that
we should be able to reinforce our position at Kerman by direct maritime
connection with India.
11. These arguments may be held on the whole to justify a pursuance of
the present proposal, though the.prospect should not be lost sight of that when
the Russian Government has carried, if it ever does carry, its trans-Persian
line nd Yezd to Kerman, resentment may be expressed at a maritime
outlet so unconcerned with Russian ambitions or interests as Bunder Abbas,
ami pressure may be put upon the British Government of the dav to agree
to a more easterly prolongation from Kerman. This, however, relates to a
iutuie still remote, and belongs to the region of speculation.
!5. ! have said nothing about the financial aspect of the case, which is not
e\ eii alluded to in these papers. How or with what resources, or subject to
what guarantees, the railway would be constructed, if it is reallv proposed
to construct it at all, has not been indicated.
24th August 1916. Curzon.