'File 1/A/38 I Negotiations with Bin Saud re:- Eastern boundary of Saudi Arabia with Qatar & Trucial Oman.' [‎39r] (82/452)

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8. It is worth while to run through the reasons I gave in my memorandum
of the 231'd February, 1932, for the then apparent deterioration of Ibn Sand’s
political position :—
(a) The administration of the Hejaz has not become less efficient, and has
perhaps somewhat improved. There are fewer internal signs of discontent with
the Saudi regime than there were in 1931. It cannot be called popular, but some
at least of the tribes are too broken to think of resistance, the townsmen seem
more resigned, and some of them have an increasing interest in the stability of
the present regime. ^
(fi) Such general indications as afford a criterion suggest that Ibn Sand
has strengthened his position vis-a-vis the extreme Wahhabi opponents of modern
ideas. It is impossible to form any exact estimate, but the King has shown
more boldness in various directions, and less is heard of the Ulama of Nejd. In
1932 he was able to make good use of the Ikhwan, without letting them get out
of hand. _ .
(c) Ibn Sand’s isolation in the Arab world is less pronounced than it was.
He has learnt to control his hatred, if not his suspicion, of the Hashimites. Care
fully nurtured sympathy with him seems to abound in Palestine and in Syria,
perhaps also in more independent Arab countries. The unexpected death of
King Feisal last year has removed his most conspicuous rival in the Arab world.
His^display of moderation in his final settlement with the Imam has advertised
him as a man who is first and foremost a good Arab, all the more so as other good
Arabs, like the would-be mediators, headed by the Grand Mufti of Palestine, have
been enabled to claim an unearned share of the credit. He has, in fact, discreetly
avoided any appearance of a desire to dominate the Arab world too exclusively
and has beaten with all the more effect the Moslem Arab drum.
(d) Remaining himself a good but not extreme Wahhabi, Ibn Saud has
tended to show greater tolerance towards Moslems of other denominations, both
Sunni and Shia. He divides the sympathies of non-Arab Moslems generally, hut
he has probably more admirers in countries like India, and perhaps the Dutch
East Indies, than he had some years ago. Even in Egypt, the third largest
contributor to the pilgrimage, there is a strong tendency to criticise King Fuad s
policy of holding him at arm’s length.
'(e) Ibn Sand is still isolated from the general life of the family ot non-
Moslem nations. Even here, however, there are signs of a readiness on his part to
increase his intercourse with individual nations; and. though the signs a.i e small,
they may foreshadow a process capable of considerable acceleration in the more
favourable conditions which would result from a consolidation of his position in
Arabia. He has realised that he must look west for any serious help in developing
his resources, witness the grant of the Hasa Oil Concession to the Americans and
his readiness to treat with Europeans for the grant of other concessions.
(f) He is still poor in competent advisers on other than purely Arab affairs.
There have been no notable additions to the list, but the men he has have giown
somewhat in stature. His Minister of Finance has learnt the useful lesson that,
while old debts may be put on the long finger, current liabilities must be met, if
credit is to be maintained. Payments in respect of immediate transactions have
been much more punctual of late. Fuad Bey Hamza is a doubtful factoi. He has
advanced in the art of diplomacy, but he does not seem to enjo\ the full confidence
of Ibn Sand, and his own heart-searchings in quest of a larger life may sweep
him out of the King’s service. Should he remain in it and letain his health, he
is capable of rendering much service as a liaison between Saudi Arabia and the
modern world. Even Sheikh Yussuf Yasin has achieved more elasticity- Some
other less well-known men have also come on, like Muhammad Tawil. a Hejazi,
whom Ibn Saud has used successfully in Hasa, and perhaps the Ibn Muammai, a
Nejdi, who represents him in Bagdad.
9. Ibn Saud has shown no further signs of physical decline. He has grown
somewhat lethargic in his habits; but he looks fit, lives a health}' life, especially in
Nejd, no longer overeats (if, indeed, there was truth in the Sheikh of Koweit s
suggestion that he used to), and imposes his will on his adviseis in all major
matters. Even the story current some time ago of his impotence seems to have
been exaggerated, as he has had a son within the last few months.
10. It would be going far beyond the mark to suggest that the future ot
the Saudi regime is assured, but Saudi Arabia offers at least as much prospect of
fl56 gg—21 B ^
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