'Persia. Incidence of (1) Cost of South Persia Rifles and (2) Political Expenditure in Persia.' [‎124v] (6/8)

ammunition
Formation
importance.
and money, and if possible a few small guns . . . .
of Military Police appears to me to be of secondary
It must necessarily take too long to be of any
immediate use
This was the course actually taken. Money, ammunition, rifles and
wuiis were supplied to Kawam. But the .mlitary operations proper as I
Understand the position, were over before the South Persia Military Police
mte si n„e. This is shown by the following telegrams
l
(g) From Sir V. Sykes to Government of India, ( Mh April 1916.
“ Total collapse of Germans and rebels will presumably render further
support to Kawam unnecessary. I suggest therefore that 1 should
march police recruits to Kerman and organise force there. Request
1 mav be mven escort similar to that asked for in my telegram
30 C dated 6th April, and strongly recommended by Minister at
Tehran in his telegram 46 F, dated 8th April. It is most desirable
to avoid risk and be independent of recruits with only few weeks’
training, unfit to defend arms and ammunition. I have already
recruited 300 men. ’
What active support Sir P. Sykes hoped to be able to give Kawam was
apparently intended to come from an escort of Indian tioops, lor the
Government of India, in sending the above telegram on, said “ Telegram
“ 12th April 1916. We agree that Sykes should move forward as soon
“as possible, and for this purpose we have asked General Officer Com-
“ manding, Force 1), to despatch if possible at once to^ Bunder Abbas one
“Squadron Cavalry, one Section Mountain Guns, two Companies Infantry,
“one of which will replace present detachment Ironi Maskat. Whether
“ Sykes should move to join Kawam. or barman 1‘aima, oi proceed to
“ Kerman, must depend on developments ol Persian situation.
(h) From Deputy Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to Government of India,
1 0th April 1916.
u ... . Following news received from variety of sources
appears to confirm news that Shiraz has been occupied on behalf
of Soulet and Kawam.”
13. It was at this period that we asked the Treasury, and they agreed, to
pay half the cost of the South Persia Military Police. Our action seems to
me to have been very appropriate.
14. If this view be confirmed, as 1 imagine it will be, by the Secretary of
State in Council, the further question remains, whether the character of the
operations in which the South Persia Military Police (or South Persia Rifles)
have been engaged since April 1916, and the nature of its organisation,
have been such as to render the bargain we then made with the Treasury
an illegal or unfair one, as the Comptroller and Auditor-General suggests.
On the information before me in these files I personally do not think so.
15. The Government of India say in their present telegram that such
local troops as Sir Percy Sykes was able to raise “were employed during
“ the past year mainly in connection with military operations, and that our
“ connection with force has been transferred on our side to Commander-in-
“ Chief and to Army Department.” They also point to the present military
organisation of the Force. The question of the extent to which the
operations of the Force have been “military operations” in any of the
accepted senses of the term is, I think, very arguable. The “ military
operations” for dealing with the German parties and the Gendarmerie
rebellion were apparently carried out, as we have seen, by the forces under
Kawam and Soulet, by the Seistan Field Force (including the irregular
levies), and (possibly) by some of the Indian troops landed at Bunder Abbas ;
not by the South Persia Military Police. So far as the South Persia Rifles