File 57/1905 ‘Arabia: - Situation in Yemen (1905-11). Arab revolt against Turks. Imam of Sanaa’s letter to the King. Fighting in Yemen 1911. Agreement between the Turks & the Imam’ [‎54v] (113/692)

Composition of Force.
The expeditionary force under orders was composed of 34 battalions (*24 regular
and 10 reserve), 6 mountain batteries, 3 machine gun companies 1 company oi^
engineers, and 2 sanitary companies : a total of about 22,500 of a ran s. '
It was placed under the command of Fenk Izzet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , Chief of the General Staff,
who is said to be a capable, level-headed man and one of the best of the Turkish
generals. He served previously in the Yemen as chief of the stall to Ahmed Feizi
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , spent some years in Germany, and is very highly thought of.
His chief of the staff is Miralai Auni Bey, who commanded the bamsun Relif
Brigade in the Albanian operations last year.
' The force was divided into three divisions, respectively under the commands of—
Lewa Ibrahim Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. (General Officer Commanding^ 4th Division at Dedeagatch).
Miralai Hamdi Bey (formerly commandant, Bulgarian frontier).
Miralai Biza Bey (who previously saw a good deal of service in the Yemen).
The difficulty of providing transports, and the large number of redifs electing to
pay the £ T. 50 exemption money for service outside Europe owing to reluctance
to serve in the Yemen, caused a certain amount of delay in moving the reinforcements.
The first contingent did not sail till the 21st January, and it was not till the end of
March that the bulk of the force arrived.
Four Turkish gun-boats, intended for patrolling purposes in the Bed Sea in
connection with gun-running, were also dispatched.
The Imam’s numbers.
The Imam was said at the outset to have 50,000 men in the field, but it is
probable these numbers are exaggerated. At the same time, when it is remembered
that most of the Turkish garrisons were besieged simultaneously, the over-estimation
cannot be very great.
Plan of Campaign.
The plan of campaign appears to have been to move a column, as soon as sufficient
troops had landed, to the relief of Menakha, which is strategically the key to Sanaa,
and, whilst awaiting further reinforcements, to strengthen the position there and
secure the line of communication with Hodeidah.
To land another column at Moka for the purpose of relieving the garrisons at Ibb,
Yerim, Dhamar, and Doaran, and clearing the country to the south.
On the arrival of Izzet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. with the main army, to make a general advance on
Sanaa. In this advance it seems to have been the idea that the southern column
should co-operate.
Gabbana, some two hours to the north of Hodeidah, was utilised (owing to cholera
having broken out among the garrison at the latter place) as the port of disembarkation
for the main column destined to the relief of Sanaa.
First Stage of the Advance.
Towards the middle of February sufficient troops had arrived to enable Biza Bey
v ith a flying column of six battalions and other details to commence his advance to
Menakha, which is about 100 miles from Hodeidah, and thus half-way to Sanaa.
C)n arrival at Huggeila, where the hilly country (Jebel) begins, Biza Bey’s column,
I mam 8 adherents were strongly posted on the heights along the
Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Hajjan, turned northwards, made a detour through the hills in order to avoid
t e mam road which runs along the dry bed of the stream, and rejoined it some miles
iiirt icr on at Wisil, from whence the route to Menakha was open. The latter, after a
siege ol over a month, was reached on the 24th February.
The enemy, evidently discovering too late that their flank had been turned by this
manoeuvre, which was made possible by the friendly co-operation of Abdulla Beshir,
bheikh ol Sa lan, withdrew in the direction of Sanaa.
Menakha, perched at an altitude of 6,000 feet on a narrow ridge joining two
(is me moun am ranges, is yell situated for defence against an enemy not in possession
ol modern guns. The garrison at the time of the investment consisted of close on