'Collection of papers respecting the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Bagdad Railway and the Purchase of Land at Koweit (amended version)' [‎7r] (13/34)

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insure their realization and the completion of this part of the railway, would be
willing to consider the question of themselves giving a guarantee to enable the
necessary British capital to be raised for that portion of the railway in regard to which
their control would cover their responsibility.
His Majesty’s Government are further of opinion that the predominant position of
British trade would justify the concession to British contractors of such harbour works
as might be required at Bagdad, Bussorah, and Koweit.
The further details of British co-operation, such as adequate representation on the
international Board which would regulate such matters as through traffic and
equalization of rates, would be the subject of subsequent arrangement.
His Majesty’s Government fully realize that the initiation and concession of the
railway have been due to German enterprise, and are quite willing to consider
favourably any practical suggestion for preserving to the Company its German origin,
which would not impair the international character that the administration of the line
should, in their opinion, assume from the moment it becomes a sea-to-sea connection,
and consequently an important through route to the East.
Foreign Office, June 4, 1907.
No. 6.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.
(No. 332. Confidential.)
Sir, Foreign Office, June 5, 1907.
I GAVE M. Cambon lo-day, confidentially, a Memorandum, embodying our views
with regard to the Pagdad Railway, of which a copy is herewith inclosed.*
Having read it, he observed that I had previously told him that control of the
southern end of the line was what we should like, but that the Memorandum went a little
further than that by saying in effect that we should participate only if we could get this
condition.
I referred to the words of the Memorandum, and admitted that they were a little
more explicit than anything I had previously said. But I pointed out that the whole
Memorandum was much more explicit, and that there was a statement about the
possibility of a British Government guarantee to insure the making of the Bagdad end,
which also went rather further than anything I had previously said. If the making of
that end was secured by such a guarantee, it would very much facilitate the raising of the
mone} for the other sections of the line.
I am, &c.
(Signed) EDWARD GREY.
No. 7.
Foreign Office to India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
(Confidential.)
Sir, Foreign Office, June 12, 1907.
I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying
copy of a Memorandum,* which has been communicated to the French and Russian
Ambassadors at this Court, on the subject of the attitude of His Majesty’s Government
in regard to British co-operation in the Bagdid Railway.
Jn view of recent developments in this question, I am to suggest, for the !
consideration of Mr. Secretary Morley, that it may now T be expedient to arrive at a
decision as to the purchase of a plot of land on the foreshore at Bunder-es-Schwmik, a
point 2 cr 3 miles south-w r est of Koweit, which may not improbably be the terminus of
the Bagdad Railway on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
As you are aware, the purchase of the land in question was prop* sed by the Resident '
in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. in a despatch dated the 11th November, 1905, which formed the
inclosure in your letter of the 17th January, 1906; but it was eventually dropped owing
to the apprehensions of His Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople that the scheme
might arouse Turkish susceptibilities.
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No. 5.
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