File 1508/1905 Pt 1 'Bahrain: situation; disurbances (1904-1905); Sheikh Ali's surrender; Question of Administration Reforms (Customs etc)' [‎106r] (216/531)

Paragraphs ly and 28. Reform of Revenue Administration and institution
of tiecord of Rights .—The remarks recorded in reference to paragraph above
apply to these reforms also except in so far as the Political Agent’s influence
can induce Sheikh Psa to improve the existing state of things of his own accord.
Paragraph 18. The Bedouin scourge.—These Arab Chieftains cannot be
expected quickly to change their ancestral and traditional ideas of which the
distribution of largesse to adherents is one of the most firmly rooted. Every one
of them, be it the Sultan of Muscat or the Sheikh of Koweit, the Pirate Coast
Chiefs or any other influential Chief in the Arabian Peninsula, likes to be thought
a modern Haroun-al-Rashid and spends a large slice of his income in subsiding
the Bedouins whom he believes to be friendly to him. Sheikh Esa’s oft quoted
reason is that these people whom he periodically entertains are tribesmen, or the
relations of tribesmen, who were kind to him many years ago when he* fell on
troublous times and was an exile in Katr. By all means let the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency.
do all he can to induce the Sheikh to keep these people away as much as pos
sible, but here again it would be difficult to forbid them altogether nor wouM it
seem advisable to issue an official prohibition without adequate means of enforc
ing 1*. I think the case could be met for the present by the police arrangements
recommended for Manama being instituted. There would then be reasonable
hope of keeping the Bedouins out of Manama or under control.
Paragraph 19 .—The Slavery question has already been treated in a sepa
rate communication. r
Paragraph 2j .—Awe is no doubt a good feeling for the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. to
inspire among tbe Sheikh’s petty retainers, but in the case of Sheikh Esa himself
the sentiment must be tempered by confidence if the result is to be satisfactory.
Paragraph 24 .—For a Vazier I recommend new blood altogether. Any
member of the Sheikh’s entourage would be handicapped by the influence of his
friends and surroundings.
Paragraph .22.—Sheikhs Hamed and Khalifa to be ordered to tour in India,
the former for at least a year, and in the event of his refusal his recognition to be
withdrawn and Khalifah recognised in his place.
Having just made a pronouncement to Sheikh Hamed regarding his future
conduct, we can hardly offer him an ultimatum in this sense in the absence of
any further delinquency on his part. A less lengthy tour would I think be an
excellent thing for him, but he would require to have an Indian or English offi
cial with him and I fear that long before the year was out he would become an
expen^Y£_wMte-elephant to the Government of India. The boy Khalifah on the
other hand after being once lodged at school should give little further trouble.
Paragraph 55.—-The formation of a small police force of 50 men for the
maintenance of order in the Manama Bazaar is a comparatively simple thing
but the maintenance of a small standing army of 300 men for protection purposes
is a much more ambitious undertaking. I quite agree that the entertainment of
such a force would be a more satisfactory means of keeping Bahrein free from
attack than the annual waste of 56,000 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. in subsidies, but the idea is
opposed to Arab traditions and I fear that except under a new Chief or a Protec
torate it is useless to think of it.
Paragraph 29 .—Captain Prideaux’s observations in this paragraph regard
ing the administration of the Customs by Sheikh Esa himself are no doubt based
on my written message to the Sheikh of June 7th of which a copy was forwarded
to Government. The allusions to the Customs question included therein were
simply made in order not to miss the opportunity afforded to me by Sheikh Esa
of introducing the topic ; but while referring to the benefits which the Muscat
Customs had derived from the withdrawal of the administrations from the
Hindoo “ farmers ”, I was careful to safeguard my remarks by saying that
the resumption of the Bahrein “ farm ” from the hands of the Banians would
be a big undertaking and that Government would require very full guaran
tees for the efficient conduct of the administration. Among these I would natural-