File 1377/1905 Pt 1 'Perso-Baluch Frontier: Frontier Demarcation' [‎146v] (64/188)

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quence to Persia, would afford a more satisfactory frontier, would promote (mod
relations between the two neighbouring- Governments, and might even be
purchased on our side by some small pecuniary payment, or by a corresponding
rectification in Persia s tavour further south. * ^ °
* •, The „ a , do P ti< ? n of the first course would, I believe, almost eertainlv end in
failure, ihe Am-ed-Uowleh would reply that he wruld refer the whole
question for Ins opinion to his local expert, the Yamin-i-Nizam ; he would
probably, or if he did not the Mushir-ed-Dowleh would, ask the opinion of the
Eussians and both the Yamin and the Russians would doubtless expose and
exaggerate the weakness of our case, and make the most of what they would
represent as a perfidious attempt on our part to filch valuable land from Persia
by misrepresentation. The net result would be to make the Persians regard
the acquisition of the blue line, or of something equivalent to it, as a matter of
vital importance to their interests, and to increase their already existing susui-
cions of our designs on Persian Baluchistan. ° ^
The second course would be fraught with less danger to our interests but
would hardly help us to realise the objects desired. Tor disguise it as we might
we should be, m fact, asking Persia to cede to us a portion of territory which*
however worthless and insignificant in itself, and whatever the original inten
tions of the two Governments as distinct from the text of the agreement can
be proved to be de jure a part of the Shah’s Dominions. “ If this rectifica-
1011 is of ^ no importance”, I should be asked, “ why do you wish for it ? There
is surely m that case no real need to revise the Holdich line or to brino* the text
o he agreement into harmony with the assumed, but unproved, intentions of
its authors . I should be told that it was out of the question for the Shah to
ahenate, m the phrase with which he has already familiarised us, “ one snan
of his territory”, and that even if he were willing to do this, the certainty of a
counter claim by Russia for an equivalent would make it impossible. It
might of course be feasible to obtain what we want by a corresponding transfer
of territory to Persia, further south, but I do not think it wo P uld be° an easy
matter to arrange.
m n ° n * tlie Per sian Government is not keenly desirous of
ex^eTo ^dfvexnP^ Siah -¥ i . r i awa j J0 ^ da ry question ; to do so will mean
expense to itself, vexatious enquiries, and threats of counter claims by Russia
aLd the maintenance of the McMahon Commission, with what the Shah
' J e " ar< s as the s'mster possibilities attaching to the presence of its armed escort
for some men hs linger in Persian territory. It is questionable whether the
fhern a Ml ^ Iste .f know or su fP ect tbat a more careful demarcation would give
them any territory over which they do not now exercise anthllt, “mu
Russians, I believe, told Mons. Naus, at the time of the Mirjawa incident that
not only Mirjawa but probably also Robat belonged by rights to Persia but I
doubt if the Persian Government would spontaneously have ev“sed or
tn v n n 0 ^, ra , I f’ * be fi uestl °n of a demarcation of the entire line from pillar 11
frontr wHh a ibke a v'f ^ ha T e A ac fi-—d for years past in an infinite
lontier with lurkey, from Mount Ararat to the Shat-el-Arab, and thev would
he quite content with an approximate boundary on the side of India so lon^
the'fpttp 0 ^ ? ropo , sed that the y sh ould make a formal cession of land which if bv
probable 1 If? a S reeme “‘ a ^eir own. It is therefore possible, and 1 hink
wMeh the Z* T/® ° Sa / to them that ’ in view of length of time for
^ntrV we“mingTo°d n ^ ^ “ I>e . , ' Sia ’ ° wi ^ t0 e^^^beyond Rsown
K; i svr;* i- Mi ?-v 3 'S- r .x
east side of the M? * Z * hardl y be identicaI with ® ““tpost on the
east side ot the Mirjawa stream or nuUa. Nor have I sufficient knowledge of