File 2869/1906 Pt 1 'Arms Traffic: Mekran Coast and Baluchistan. (correspondence 1906-7)' [‎51v] (107/576)

12. The arms once landed on the Persian coast are met by caravans and
taken by various routes through Persian Baluchistan where, as I have stated, a
considerable number is disposed of, especially at Jalk, now the centre of a grow
ing arms trade. There is a certain amount of smuggling in small consignments
across our Baluch border, and this it is impossible to stop ; under present condi
tions it must inevitably increase as our Baluch and Brahui tribes become
more and more imbued with a desire to possess rifles.
Through Persian Baluchistan the arms are taken northwards towards
Afghanistan. On theMekran frontier we have outposts garrisoned by the
Mekran Levy Corps as far north as Panjgur ; from this point to Amalaf
we are at present dependent for any preventive measures upon the Chief of
Kharan, not a very reliable personage in this respect because he gains more
by the increase of the traffic than by its suppression.
Prom Amalaf to Robat, at the extreme northwest corner of British
territory, we asrain have a series of outposts garrisoned by the levies, while at
Robat itself there is at present a military detachment of 200 Native Infantry.
13. It is at this northern portion of our frontier, through which many of
the Afghan arms caravans have found their way in the past, that we first come
into direct contact with the Afghan arms traffic. So long as the traders
travelled in small parties they found little dfficulty in evading our posts by
using one or other of the numerous routes across the narrow triangular strip of
British territory between the Persian and Afghan frontiers. Latterly, however,
the caravans have become larger and the traders more daring. On two recent
occasions they have disdained to endeavour to slip through in small parties by
circuitous routes and have boldly proceeded with large and well armed escorts
along one of the more direct and shorter routes, that through the Kacha nullah.
The first and larger caravan overpowered the small levy force which attempt
ed to block its passage and succeeded in forcing its way through. The second
was less successful ; it was met by a combined force of regulars and levies and
was captured after many hours of stubborn resistance. Although by far the
smaller of the two caravans, it yielded a prize of no less than 794 rifles and
62,000 rounds of ammunition.
14. The loss of arms, camels and men incurred by this caravan, heavy
though it was, cannot he expected to check even temporarily the growing trade
in arms into Afghanistan. The profits are so large and means of evading capture
so many that we can look for no good or lasting results from this solitary
success. On the contrary, the caravans will now choose their route with greater
caution and will only venture to pass through our territory if they are in
sufficient strength to overcome our available opposition. A slight detour will
enable them to°avoid our territory and reach Afghanistan by one or other of the
many routes south or north of Seistan. Opposition on the part of the Persians
need not be considered. The Persian force which recently collected to block the
route near Bobat vanished by desertion as soon as it assembled, and the idea of
a body of Persians, however large, whether regular troops or levies, even sup
posing it found rself on the right route, offering serious opposition to a well-
armed party of determined Afghans, however small, is, to anyone acquainted
with Persian methods, absolutely incredible.
15. If we review past results, we find that of the many arms caravans
which have come from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. towards Afghanistan we have captured
one and one only. While we are extremely unlikely to capture a second, we
have the unpleasant prospect ever before us of seeing at some time or other one
of our detachments overpowered in the attempt to block the- road of a ffio
strongly escorted caravan. Our endeavours therefore to check the arms traffic
on land seem hardly more successful than our endeavours at sea. The latter
are ineffective and expensive ; the former are not only ineffective and expensive,
they are dangerous also.
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