File 2869/1906 Pt 1 'Arms Traffic: Mekran Coast and Baluchistan. (correspondence 1906-7)' [‎53r] (110/576)

present relations with Franco and the United States the treaty difficulties can
hardly present an insuperable obstacle, while the compensation of the Sultan is
merely a matter of money payment. Such a payment on our part, moreover,
would have the additional political advantage" of strengthening our position
very materially with the Sultan. The existing state of affairs whereby he
derives large profits from a trade which he knows to be most repugnant to us,
can hardly serve to impress him to our advantage. He has doubtless long
wondered how it is we are not powerful enough to have Maskat closed as a port
of importation for arms, and has more than once taxed Major Grey to suggest
• Firfe huletter No. 664 of 2cth Kovembcr 1906 . the explanation why we have not taken
that measure. As Major Grey has point
ed* out, such a step so far from impairing our present cordial relations with the
Sultan would tend in no small measure to increase our influence with him.
25. The dangers of delay in taking this step are self evident. Not only
+Thp value of arms Hnd ammunition imported into V ill the Sllltdn S incomef from the traffic
during UO 6 07 has already reached Rs. grow with every year it is allowed to
continue and render it more and more
costly to recompense him for its loss, the interests of other nations in the trade
will spring up and make a settlement increasingly difficult. The cost of settle
ment even at the present juncture may be fairly high, yet it falls far short of
the cost of the only other measures which can check traffic, and is nothing to
thy expense to which we will inevitably be put in our endeavours to cope
vith the results of a continued unrestricted import of arms on to our frontier.
26. I have been led into a longer discussion of this question than was at
first intended, hut the importance of it from the point of view of this Province
serves as a sufficient excuse. I sincerely trust that His Majesty's Government
may be moved to take early steps to close Maskat as a port of importation for
arms, and thus accomplish the most effective if not the only means of putting a
stop to the pernicious influx of arms and ammunition into our frontier.
I attach a note on the coast line between Minab and Jask prepared from
Naval sources by Major W. G Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Maskat,
to whom I am indebted for much valuable information on the arms trade in
the Gulf.
Note on coast between Jaslc and Minab river by Major W. 0. Grey ) Political
Agents Ma*kat.
I Nature of coast) etc.—{l) Jask to Ras-ul-Kuh{ (35 miles).
The whole shore line is very low lying and is swampy for some distance
from the beach ; large tracts are simply mud flats with shallow creeks at low
water and at high water a large expanse of shallow water. Between this
swampy ground and the hills (6 miles or less inland) is some good grazing,
camels seem to be habitually brought here for that purpose.
(2) Bas-ul-Kuh { to Minab river (about 90 miles).
At Ras-ul-Kuh itself and for some 10 miles to the north there is firm
ground right up to the sea shore. From thence to Minab the foreshore is very
swampy indeed, with mangroves, for about 5 miles inland. Here the
“ going ” is very bad.
II. Khors. Ihe only khors suitable for runninar into between Minab and
Jask are {a) Khagun, about 45 miles from Bunder Abbas, and (ft) Khor
Kumari, about 50 miles to the south. This latler is really an inlet into the
stretch of swampy ground and although suitable for moderate-sized dhows
would be difficult to make in anything but calm weather—a thing rarely
obtainable in the 6/>amal season (November to April). But that the place is
used it evident from the camel marks which were seen at the entrance to the
khor, probably there is some track through the mangrove swamp.
t Sic, must be Has Kuh-i-A! nbarak, but see sketch. Its common name among I be people is as given by Hose.
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