'Memorandum respecting the Bagdad Railway' [‎157r] (31/52)

“ Fears have been expressed that at one moment or
another either Germany or France, or possibly both
countries, may, for political reasons, come to terms
with Russia and find it in their interest to make over
their share, or else to buy off her hostility by supporting
her claims for Russian access to the shores of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . These are contingencies, however,
which might arise in any case, whether England
participates or not in the construction of the Railway.
Indeed, an arrangement with Russia would be more
urgently required, and at the same time more easy of
accomplishment, if England stands out than if she
participates.”
The principal contentions of the press in
regard to the inadvisability of British participa
tion are dealt with in the extracts from Sir N.
O’Conor’s despatch, but particular capital was
made out of certain assurances which were
requested from His Majesty’s Government in
the event of a basis of co-operation being agreed
upon.
The assurances in question were as follows:—
1. That objection should not be raised to the
increase of the Turkish customs duties, of which
a part should be used in guarantees for the
Bagdad Railway.
2. That if the Railway should prove a sub
stantially better route for conveying the mails to
India, it should receive the subsidy at present
granted to British steam-ship lines.
3. That His Majesty’s Government should lend
their good offices in providing a proper terminus
at or near Koweit.
The first and third points are now devoid of
practical interest, since the increase of the
customs is in process of arrangement, and the
additional revenue is to he devoted to the xequiie-
ments of Macedonian reform ; while a British
officer, dispatched to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. on a
special mission to carry out surveys on the spot,
has recently reported that Koweit is by no means
the only convenient terminus, various places,
outside the limits of any possible extension of
British protection, being equally suitable for the
purpose in view.
The second point is one of considerable
importance. It is, however, merely a question of
degree, and it may be doubted whether the