'11/5 Negotiations with Ibn Saud regarding Boundaries of Saudi Arabia' [‎47r] (93/430)

Ext, 8036/46 / (),
lUmSZRX OP FUEL & POWER,
Petroleum Division,
7, Embank;,
Ipnlon, S.v/. 1*
28th November, 1946.
^ dear Eion,
we have now had an inf ormal exchange of views with the U.o. State De^ar tanent
•nresentatives over here on the Continental Shelf issue as it afiects xha
n!-«aa Gulf, and on the question of the Qatar/Saudi Arabia boundary. On the
wti'question the Americans enquired uhat was the bate*; position because they
£n“bat it was desirable, if possible, to aToid difficult political issues being
raised through operations by oil companies which might develop in the "n^p.d e-band*
at the base of the Qatar Peninsula.
It has been agreed that the State Department and the British side respectively
•oald ascertain from the oil concessionaires in Qatar and Saudi Arabia whether oil
oaerations were contemplated in the .neighbourhood of the uncertain Qatar/Saudi Arabia
wriarv.. We have found out from Petroleum Concessions United that
aoutherracst drilling location under their present programme is about 44Jalosetres
north of the Qatar/Saudi Arabia boundary as defined on the map attached to their
iareement with the Sheikh of Qatar. Drilling at this location is due to start in
the first of 1947 and on its results will depend whether the Gcetpany wil-
wish to extend drilling further south.
The State Department will, obviously, not be in a position to report on the
intentions of the Caltex under their Saudi Arabian concession for some *hile. But
it occurs to me that it might be worth considering whether it would be useful to
to somewhat further with the State Department towards an arrangement which would
dimniah the possibility of uncontrolled oil exploration and possible discoveries
in the "no-man*s-land" area between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Do you trunk ,ha
something on the following lines would be worth while?
(a) To discuss in & little more detail with the State Department
the uncertainty about the Qatar/Saudi Arabia boundary line.
(b) Indicate that, from the point of view of H.M.G.,,we wo^ld not . .
wish to recognise the right of Caltex under their Saudi Arabian
concession to operate north of the yellow line which was, laid dcwn
by in its last discussions with Ibn Saud; and that, in ary
event, if Caltex should wish to operate north of this line they „ „
should inform the State Department with a view to discussion with H.Mw.
(c) The Americans mi^it wish to know within what sphere P.C.L. would be
free to operate under their Qatar concession and we would not wish to
disclose the boundary line appearing on the map attached tc their
concession. Moreover, one of Ibn Saud*s claims intrudes on the P.C.L.
concession area so defined. Would it, however, be fe&sxo-^
the P.C.L. concession line, or some other similar line across the
Qatar Peninsula, to the Americans as an informal frontier beyond which
we would arrange with P.C.L. that they also would not operate without
consulting who would then consult with the State Department r
(d) It may be that an arrangement on these lines could ne w oe put into
' ; effort by the State Department via-a-vis Caltex or that the arrangement
would ootoe to the ears of, Ibn Saud. On the former point, however, it
might be worth at least S^cussing the possibility with the State
Department; and on the .-tter point we should have been oon^s tent ith
the attitude we took in our last discussions with Ibn and, any
case, would we be any worse off "than without any atwenrpt at an
arrangement with the State Department on these lines? Further, withou
some such arrangement, there is the risk tnat a discovery cy one o
companies may precipitate all these difficulties in a more acute form.