'11/5 Negotiations with Ibn Saud regarding Boundaries of Saudi Arabia' [‎175v] (352/430)

12
2124/258/
91(1937)
2124/268/
91 (1937).
whole Question it would have been most desirable, but the frontier question was
rvidenSv a ruse of annoyance to Ibn Sand and ,n these circumstances and on
“ .f the difference of opinion about the purely geographical aspects of the
Je^ Nakhsharea. to press the British claim in that quarter would be to endanger
jeoei ivaiuisu ■ , r . ff . f t | ie Rendel conversations. In view' of His
Mai«tvTGover,m.ent r s declarations on this subject, Ibn Sand might well feel
1 a he could not hope to obtain either of the two areas which he coveted, hut that
o w the same thin® as signing them awav. As regards the dangers arising
"an td^rnTnel fronler, W Majesty’s Minister believed that, in the
event of war if Ibn Saud were hostile to His Majesty s Government a purely
mner frontier would not deter him from aggressive action, while if he were
IXr an ally or a neutral, he would be unlikely to disturb the quo.
Su K Bullard urged therefore that, in order not to let the frontier claims go by
defnnlt a special joint commission should be sent to examine the purely
Graphical features of the Jebel Nakhsh area. At the same time he urged that
His Majesty's Government should consider giving Ibn Saud a royalty on any
oil whici might be found in or near the Jebel Nakhsh, on the pretext that the
oil-bearing strata must run partly under his territory (though a similar plan
had been found impracticable w-hen Iraq had endeavoured to buv off lurkish
intransigence about Mosul). Finally, he pointed out the strain that would be
placed on Ibn Saud if the search for oil and minerals m Saudi Arabia continued
to be unsuccessful, while oil were found, as in the case of Bahrein, in the territory
of some completely unimportant ruler like the Sheikh of Qatar.
43 On the 7th May, 1937, the Foreign Office replied that, while the
undesirability of pressing Ibn Saud for a decision was appreciated, an undeter
mined frontier must, in "their opinion, constitute a continual source of danger
and uncertainty, particularly since Petroleum Development (Qatar), Limited (a
subsidiary of Petroleum Concessions, Limited, to whom the Anglo-Iraman Oil
Company had transferred their Qatar rights on the 5th February, 1937), were
hopin 0, to bee in prospecting in the south-western area of the Qatar peninsula.
If nothin 0 ' were done to effect at least a crystallization oi tne tiontu i on lines
which appeared reasonable to His Majesty’s Government, and therefore to fulfil
their obligations to the Arab States on the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. , it was always possible
that Ibn Saud would continue to pursue his former tactics and seek to extend his
influence, thereby rendering the possibility of effecting a territorial settlement
increasingly remote, particularly if Anglo-Saudi relations deteriorated as a result
of the imminent publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine.
In the circumstances His Majesty’s Minister was asked whether he advocated
a unilateral declaration by His Majesty’s Government, to be treated, if necessary,
as confidential, defining the line which they regarded as the boundary. It was
suggested that this might be done in an amicably phrased note explaining that,
though His Majesty’s Government appreciated the reasons for Ibn Sand’s
unwillingness to commit himself at this juncture, it was impossible for Hi;
Majesty’s Government to allow the question to continue in its present indeter
minate'state. It was intended that the note, after defining the northern sector
of the frontier on the lines of the Riyadh proposals, modified to take account of
the newly defined position of Safaq, should explain that His Majesty’s Govern
ment did not intend to claim territory either for themselves or for the Arab
Sheikhs in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. beyond that line; they proposed to treat the territory
on the Qatar and Abu Dhabi side of the line as either under the control of His
Majesty’s Government or the suzerainty of the Arab rulers concerned; finally,
while His Majesty’s Government desired to record their position in this question
to avoid misunderstanding, they would, in order to spare Ibn Saud any possible
embarrassment, refrain from pressing for publication.
44. Sir R. Bullard’s reply was that the possibility of an early commence
ment of oil prospecting might soon justify the proposed communication, but
suggested that, in order to sugar the pill, it was important first to return the
most favourable reply possible to a recent request of Ibn Sand’s for arms
(reminding him of the arms supplied at a critical moment in 1929 and saying
either that His Majesty’s Government did not propose to press at present for
payment for the arms supplied then, or else, better still, that they proposed to
overlook the question of eventual payment), and then to send a sympathetic note
about Ibn Sand’s complaints of His Majesty’s Government’s policy of “ encircle
ment,’ in which an offer should be made to show any Saudi representative whom
His Majesty might care to appoint that the Jebel Nakhsh formed part of the
Jebel Dukhan