'Employment of Japanese Troops in Mesopotamia' [‎25r] (3/6)

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fhi-oiighout Iraq to be the nearest important centre of commerce ami
civilisation, and before* the war the inhabitants of i’.asra used t
regard Bombay and Baghdad as equidistant. Indian interests are
houevet, chiefly engaged on account of the pilgrimage of British'
subjects and protected persons to the Holy Places. Besides the well-
known idnah shrines of hadlumein, Kerbela. and Neiof, there are
Sunni places of pilgrimage .... at Baghdad, besides others
neai Jiasia, winch exert a strong attraction r pj le ‘ p; r >
of Baghdad used to pay periodic visits to Delhi; and lastly the
•administration of the well-known Oudh bequest has fostered’ the
mhan attac.unent. Before the war there were about 3,000 Indians
resident in the Baghdad Vilayat alone . . .
I he country has, in fact, Jong been regarded as falling within the sphere
ol India s external relations, a view which found fprinai expression in the
arrangement under which the post of Consul-General at Baghdad was
normally Idled before the war by an officer of the Indian Poiiticd'Lepart-
(Government of India as well as to the
merit, who reported direct to the ^ ao nciL us w in
Ambassador at, ( onstantinople, and who bore, in addition to his Consul ir
designation, the Indian title of “ Resident ” in Turkish Arabia A term used by the British officials to describe the territory roughly corresponding to, but not coextensive with, modern-day Iraq under the control of the Ottoman Empire. .
As regards the second point, the Mesopotamian campaign has from the
lu st been popularly regarded, to quote Mr. Montagu’s words, as an “ Indian
slunv. In its early stages it was conducted from Indian headquarters-
India Inis iiirmshed the majority of the lighting men, and lias served
throughout as the base ol supply and reinforcement. It may be said with
truth that the operations in Mesopotamia have excited more general interest
in India and have been more generally regarded there in~the light of a
domestic concern than those in any of the other great threatres of war.
(). For these reasons the arguments advanced by Lord Curzon in regard
to I’ersia and Arabia appear to the Department to apply with* no less force
to .Mesopotamia. If we^invoke Japanese aid in lighting what the Asiatic
regards as our " Indian ” battles, he will draw the conclusion that we are no
longer strong enough to light them for ourselves. Our next step, lie will
probably argue, will be to call in Japanese troops to help us to maintain
order in India itself. Rumours crediting us with this intention have already
found some currency, and any action tending to give them colour might
have a very adverse ellect upon the internal tranquillity of India.
As regards the second of the (Government of India’s “political”
objections, Muhammadan opinion is known to be extremely sensitive as to
the introduction of “idolatry” or what Islam regards as such—into the
sacred soil of Iraq. The (ioverument of India recently felt themselves
compelled, in deference to these feelings, to abandon a project, for which
money had been collected in India, of building u (hirudicara at Basra for
the use ol the Sikh troops; and similar complications might easilv arise
in connection with the Japanese. 'The Arab is resentful of all external
intrusion, and would doubtless view the intervention of Japan with dislike
and suspicion.
7. I he (Government of India make one notable point which was
not referred to in Mr. Montagu’s letter, viz., that the employment
of Japanese troops in Mesopotamia would involve the establishment
of a Japanese military base in India itself. As to this, Sir II. Cox
writes:—“There is little doubt that the employment of Japanese
“ troops in Mesopotamia must include a Japanese base in India.
Even if their force was sufficiently well found to be independent of
“ India in all matters of equipment, stores, &c., it would be impossible to
“ resist granting room at Indian ports aiulhill stations for their sick and
“wounded.” If this view is accepted as correct, as it apparently must be,
it affords a further powerful argument against the whole proposal. The
establishment of a Japanese base in India would obviously give colour to
the rumours mentioned in paragraph (3. But it might have still more
unfortunate results in another direction. There is a risk that the Japanese
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