'Aden' [‎36v] (2/6)

As regards the first question, the suggestion that Aden should be severed entirely
from India and transferred to the administration of the Imperial Ciovernment has
been made more than once in the past, and apart from the developments of Indian
public opinion in the last year or two, no objection, it is believed has been taken to
it in principle in recent years. The Government of India themselves ottered in l.X)o
(subject of course, to financial conditions which will be noticed latei) to tianslci
Aden and again in 1917 they expressed their concurrence with the proposal
The connection of Aden with India is indeed little more than a result ol the
historical accident of its capture by a force from India. The direct interests of India
in Aden are not great. Only a numerically small proportion of the present population
is of Indian birth (though tlie Indian residents include many of the most prominent
merchants, and have taken a leading part in the growth of the Settlement and Port),
and India’s share in the export and import trade, though important, is not
preponderating. „ . , • ... i p
On the other hand, the situation of Aden, its position in command ot the most
important trade route of the world, which unites Great Britain not only with India
but also with East Africa, Mesopotamia, Ceylon, the Ear East, and Australia, and its
proximity to the Hedjaz, to Central Arabia and Somaliland, render the control oi its
policy and defence a matter of Imperial importance. The decision to create a naval
base at Singapore would appear to accentuate the force of these considerations. Urn
understood to be the view of the General Staff that, having regard especially to
possible constitutional and political developments in India, Imperial strategic interests
would best be secured by the transfer of Aden to His Majesty’s Government. 1 he
requirements of a unified Middle Eastern policy presumably point m the same
direction. The Masterton-Smith Committee, on whose report the Middle Eastern
Department of the Colonial Ottice was set up, recommended that Aden should be
taken over by the Colonial Office, and the recommendation was approved by the
Cabinet, subject to the approval of the Government of India, which (primarily for
financial reasons) has not yet been obtained. . . .
Against such positive reasons, from the Imperial point ot view, lor transferring
\den has to be set the fact that a very strong feeling against transfer in principle has
been manifested recently in Indian political circles. In September 1921 the Council
of State passed a resolution in favour of the retention of Aden by India with only
one dissentient. There is no reason to think that the Legislative Assembly would
take a different view, and the Government of India have promised that the matter
will not be decided without giving the Assembly an opportunity for discussion The
Government of India have reported since that Indian opinion has continued to harden
ao-ainst the relinquishment of Aden. The only chance of obtaining the assent oi the
Indian Legislature would appear to be for His Majesty’s Government to offer terms
so financially attractive as to outweigh other considerations m a time of financial
stringency. . „ „ • , i • i -u i 4 . i ~i
This introduces the question of finance, with which it will be necessary to deal
at some length. A table is appended ghowing, according to the latest information
available in the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , the total expenditure at Aden, and its division between
Imperial and Indian revenues, for each year since 1910, and for some earlier years.
It will be seen that before the war the total cost of Aden worked out approximately
at 200 000L a year. Prior to 1900 India bore the whole charge, civil and military.
In that year the question was examined by the Welby Commission, who recorded
the opinion that “if the Empire were organised as a whole, Aden would be an
Imperial charge, towards which the members of the Empire would contribute, but
in the absence of such an organisation another arrangement must be made, and the
equity of the case would perhaps be met if the United Kingdom were to contribute
one-half of the military charges.” (The civil charges, it will be noted, are compara
tively insignificant in amount. 1 lie whole question is in effect one of militai\
pursuance of this recommendation it was arranged that from 1900 onwards,
thou a h Aden continued to lie administered by India, the obligation of the Impeual
Government should be recognised by their making a contribution of a fixed annual
sum of 7 9 000Z towards Aden charges, in addition to bearing half the capital outlay
on special’ defence works. This contribution has continued unchanged up to the
present time (supplemented only 7 , as explained belou, by an additional conti ibution in
respect of additions to the strength of the garrison due to the war).
of
( X ()TF _The contribution actually credited by the Home Government in respect
Aden was nominally 100,000b ; but of this amount 28,000b was really in substitution