File 619/1907 Pt 5 'Arms Traffic:- Persian Gulf - Blockade (correspondence 1912-1920).' [‎132v] (269/608)

1 . Prom 2 nd September 1913 (date of my arrival in Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
waters) until 20 th January 1914, it was not possible owing to the delicacy 0 f
the Maskat situation and to the paucity of ships available to maintain a really
effective blockade. (As a result 1,124 rifles were reported to have beea
landed during this period.)
2. From 21st January to 6th April 1914, with the exception of a few
days in March, an effective blockade was maintained and a marked reduction
in gun-running resulted (67 rifles having been reported as landed).
3 . On 6 th April 1914 the blockade of the Mekran coast was raised owing
to the assembly of the East Indies Fleet under the Commander-in-Chief at
Maskat.
4 . It was felt that the total cessation of the blockade which must very
soon become known to all arms-runners, would be the signal for renewed
activity on their part, hut to give the point full play the Mekran coast was
purposely left unwatched even after the departure of the Commander-in-Chief,
and it has remained unwatched up to the present moment, i.e., from 7th April
to 6 th May 1914.
5 . The results, hardly anticipated, are as follows:—
IVith both coast lines (Oman and Mekran), and the sea absolutely
unguarded, the total number of rifles reported to have been landed (see attached
sheet on the Persian coast during this period (7th April to 6 th May)
amount to a total of only 54 rifles. It may be contended that this somewhat
remarkable inactivity on the part of the gun-runners is due to the fact that
no arms caravans leave the Mekran coast for the interior after April, but the
value of such contention is discounted by the common knowledge that the one
and great object cf the arms-runner is to get his cargo safely over to the Persian
cc as , si me, once there, the rifles can be, and are, buried or hidden (occasionally
for months) until such time as they can be conveniently collected and carried
overland to their final destination.
6 . I am consequently of opinion, and this opinion is amply borne ont by
the latest reports (Nos. 45 of oth March 1914 and 96 of 13th April 1914) of
Mr. Misick, Superintendent of Police at Karachi, that the surj)lus stocks of
arms and ammunition in Oman territory are now negligible.
7. In my telegram No. 10 to Commander-in-Chief, of 8 th February 1914,
I maintained with reference to these stocks that until some reliable proof of
their negligibility could be obtained, the continuance ot the blockade on its
present basis was desirable,
8 . The foregoing facts supply, I submit, the required proof , r and it is
therefore considered that the blockade, in its present form, may now, tv it
reasonable safety, be reduced.
9. Thanks to the stringent measures taken against arms merchants,
the searching and detention of dhows on suspicion, and the deportationo
persons implicated, especially that (in December 1913) of Ali Khan,
notorious Maskat arms merchant, Ma&kat and the Batinah coast towns ave
now become, comparatively speaking, negligible factors in the arms ra
situation, yet so long as large profits can he made without undue risks, so 0 D 3
will there be attempts at carrying on this traffic in one form or ano eri
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. waters.
10. At present there are the strongest grounds for believing tha a ^
md ammunition (hidden in beer casks, &c.) are smuggled into toe ^
Jerraan steamers of the Hamburg-Amerika line—the method usually a op
Deing to stop in the vicinity of Larak Island off Kishm, and to trans er ‘
iountraband into dhows, which then land their cargo as convenient a 180
spots on the Oman or Persian coasts. As the place of the transfer can ^
iltered by arrangement to any place in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , it will pm
bund necessary to more or less shadow the steamer, and the politica
ability of such a step must be first considered.
11. There is little doubt that if this form of smuggling were to
serious proportions, the fact would very soon become known throug