'Historical Memorandum on the Relations of the Wahabi Amirs and Ibn Saud with Eastern Arabia and the British Government, 1800-1934' [‎18v] (36/64)

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menace of Turkish aggression only possible from the East by way of Hasa and
from the Wbst by IVIecca and IVIedina. ho withstand the burks from both
directions they felt was beyond their strength, and to render secure their eastern
borders, thus making their full force available for the defence of their western
boundaries, was one of the reasons for their desire to evict the Tuiks from Hasa
and Katif. Another most important one was that possession of these rich
districts, with their ports, and especially Ojair, would furnish a valuable source
of revenue. Moreover, the As Baud had other grounds, and just ones, for their
claim to Hasa and Katif. One was that these districts formerly belonged to their
house; another was that the Turks themselves, in a document given to Abdulla
bin Faisal by Nafiz Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , the General who commanded Midhat Pasha’s
expedition to Katif in 1871, had agreed that the area should belong to and be
governed by Abdulla and his family. The Amir informed me that this document
had only recently come into his possession, and on his return to Riyadh he would
send me a copy. Another document of which he had heard, but so far had not
succeeded in tracing, was one which purported to be an agreement made by
Colonel Sir Lewis Pelly guaranteeing on behalf of the British Government that
the As Saud family would be recognised as the Sheikhs of the Katif District.
This document, he said, was the result of negotiations after the naval action at
Katif and Dammam (in 1865), when four men named Muhammad bin Ma’ana,
Abdul Aziz bin Umr, Saleh A1 Widawi and Ibrahim bin Ghanim were sent by
Faisal As Saud as his representatives to the Resident. I have no archives with
which to test the accuracy of the Amir’s assertions, but I find a declaration
printed on page 156 of Aitchison’s Treaties, Vol. XII, as No. XXVIII, which
seems to bear on this transaction.”
157. Captain Shakespear in his report stated that while for want of early
records he was unaware of the earlier relations of H.M. Government with the
As Saud family, “ I am aware, however, that we had frequently to take punitive
measures against the Wahabis for interference with the Trucial Chiefs and
Bahrein, but in this connection now I am convinced that ‘ Bin Saud ’ would be
only too glad to furnish us with any undertaking we desired for the maintenance
of the ‘ Status quo ’ in the future.”
J58. Sir Percy Cox, in forwarding this report, remarked: “As regards
Captain Shakespear’s references to past history and to certain putative
agreements between the British Government and the Wahabi Amir, I think one
of the letters to which he refers is probably that addressed by Colonel Pelly to
the Amir on 6 th January, 1866, in which he alluded to ‘ Your Highness’s
Governor of Katif,’* . . . My own records have not so far produced anything
of utility.”
P.R. to G.
of I., 866,
13.5.13,
P. 1921/13.
P. 2025/13.
P. 2182/13.
P.O. to I.O.,
7.6.13,
P. 2286/13.
S. of S. to
Vicei-oy,
10.6.13.
Nejd Precis,
§103.
Capture of Hasa by Ibn Saud: May 1913.
159. On 13th May 1913 the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. reported that Ibn Saud had
captured Hasa without opposition. On 31st May the Viceroy reported that
Sir P. Cox had pointed out that the draft Anglo-Turkish Convention, which had
been under consideration since 1911 with a view to regulating relations between
Turkey and H.M. Government in the Gulf Area, and which inter alia dealt with
Nejd as a Turkish Sanjak, and the expulsion of the Turks from Nejd and Hasa,
were somewhat irreconcilable phenomena, and had suggested the possibility of
getting the Turks to look the facts in the face and ‘ ‘ with our help to arrange to
include in the Convention a satisfactory solution of the problem, the basis being
that Ibn Saud should be recognised as autonomous ruler of Nejd under the
suzerainty of the Porte, and that we should be accorded the right to accredit an agent
to him as one of the maritime rulers and make agreements with him, with the
knowledge of the Porte, in connection with the suppression of the arms traffic,
slave trade and piracy, and our mission in the Gulf generally.”
160 The Government of India thought it impossible at this late hour to raise
the question of the status of Nejd without running the risk of wrecking the
negotiations with Turkey—a view accepted by the Foreign Office; and
Sir Edward Grey indicated that he thought it “ preferable to await developments,
* This letter embodied an ultimatum to the Wahabi Amir in regard to the Sur incident of 1865,
and stated : “ This letter will be handed to Your Highness’s Governor of Katif. . . .”