File 348/1913 Pt 2 'Persia: Kerman affairs' [‎103r] (210/284)

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supervision ” of the police and some interest in the regular force. Lecoffre is, of
course, the moving spirit in this and, as he knows that it is not likely to receive
our approval, he is studiously uncandid with me. Having thus felt my way I
addressed Glimstedt officially begging that he would kindly inform me exactly
on what footing these matters now stood, and I at once received a full and
straightforward statement of which the following is a summary : —
(1) Police .—Two months ago Lecoffre proposed that Glimstedt should take
over the command of the Police. Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Nusrat agreed and telegraphed to
Tehran. Glimstedt expressed willingness to do so in principle but asked for
time to study the question before (giving ?) decisive reply. The present “ nomi
nal supervision ” consists in the Chief of Police coming to Glimstedt’s office for
consultations and in the Police joining the gendarmes in their weekly review.
Re-organisation of the Police demands European control. No need for
special officer to be deputed since with some loyal Persian subordinates the
Officer-Instructors of the gendarmerie will be able to undertake the work.
Glimstedt’s requirement is that Tehran should send down suitable Persian
subordinates, and that the administration of the Police should be placed under
control, at least financial, of the gendarmerie.
(2) Army .—Lecoffre claimed military protection for State properties. Sar
dar Nusrat applied to Tehran for the necessary arms and ammunition but
received no reply to the application, Glimstedt telegraphed to his Chief asking
for arms and ammunition and selected officers and requiring that arms and ap
pointed officers should be put in his hands.
Such arrangement only temporary because when the gendarmerie (are ?)
fully established on the Kerman-Bandar Abbas and Kerman-Shiraz routes,
Glimstedt intends to undertake the protection of life and property off the trade
routes in which case there will exist no raison d'etre for either army or road
guards; but in the meantime treasury must be protected.
Should SardaPs demands be rejected by Tehran, Glimstedt holds that both
road guard and army budgets should be transferred to the gendarmerie. This
would enable the gendarmerie to make “ peaceful demonstrations ” throughout
the countryside with the happiest results. Summary ends.
All these proposals have been put in to Tehran without my being consulted,
except so far as reported in my diary paragraphs 642 to 646 and announcement
from Glimstedt two days ago that he had recommended the appointment of
European trained Chief of Police for Kerman from Tehran if a change were
made.
The whole thing’s absolute folly.
I shall, as soon as possible, call Glimstedt’s and perhaps Lecoffre s atten
tion to the fact that the mission of the gendarmerie in Kerman is wholly and
solely the protection of the Bandar Abbas trade route. Towards this we do not
seem to have made much progress yet.
Enclosure No. 3.
Telegram R., No. 9, dated (and received) 7th February 1914-
From—His Majesty’s Minister, Tehran,
To—His Majesty's Consul, Kerman. (Repeated Resident, No. 35 *)
•Enclosure 2 ante. Your telegram* No. 5 *
I am strongly of opinion that both Lecoffre and Glimstedt should have con
sulted you more on these important questions. The only chance or omg goo
work is by a frank exchange of views. I shall speak both to Mornar an e
General Officer Commanding.
Swedish Police Officers who have been here about a year have done such
good work that it is intended gradually to extend their operations all over rersia
Meanwhile the Persian Government wishes the gendarmes to take over e o
work temporarily.