'Persia, Herat, and Seistan' [‎80v] (4/28)

dressed to t\e Minister for Foreign Affairs. In
this letter His Majesty refused in very arbitrary and
peremptory terms to entertain the wish of Her
Majesty’s (xovernment for the opening to steam
navigation of the Karan river, a request which I
have been for some time urging. He further de
clared his intention of not acceding to the represen
tations which, in obedience to your Lordship’s
instructions, I had made, to prevent the employment
of Russian officers to drill the Persian cavalry.
“ His Majesty then went on to say that the per
tinacity with which Her Majesty’s Government urged
the opening of the Karan aroused his suspicions;
that Persia was not like Afghanistan, hut an indepen
dent power; that, if his leave were asked to navigate
the river, he refused to give it; that if England
intended force, that was another thing, etc.
“ In communicating this to the Viceroy of India,
I have remarked that His Excellency will judge
whether or not the Shah’s action and language
ought to affect the correctness of the opinions which
I had at His Excellency’s request ventured to ex
press in my previous telegram.”
On the 9th of February following, the Marquis
of Salisbury received a telegram from Mr. Thomson
(dated 8th idem) communicating a further opinion
as conveyed by him to the Viceroy of India, in
reply to a telegram from His Excellency on this
subject. He said,—
“ Though Russia has lately been using every
means to increase her influence here, and that
influence has always been essentially detrimental
to England, there is nothing sufficiently alarmino*
at this moment to necessitate any immediate de
cision as to cession of Afghan territory, and I
think with Your Excellency that it would be better
to allow the position to develop itself. The Persians
are not moving, nor do they show any signs of
so doing, and any cession made this moment might
he attributed to a desire on our part to keep them
quiet, and thereby lose its good effect.
“ I consider that nothing that we could offer
Persia would permanently exclude Russian in
fluences opposed to our Asian policy, but the ces
sion of Seistan, if accompanied by a resolute atti
tude, would bring about such satisfactory relations
as would enable us to contend against them. The
cession of Herat even would, in my opinion, not
only not exclude Russian influence permanently
hut prove an additional source of dan o'er. To
secure ourselves against Russia, we must absolutely
dominate Herat, but the Persians are so untrust
worthy, and are so exposed to Russian seduction
and coercion, that their presence there would in
evitably end in opening the door to Russia. No
cession, therefore, should, I think, be made that
would put Persia m apposition by which Russia
might ultimately benefit, for, though we mi (flit
gain a temporary advantage, the Russians would
probably secure real profit. Our policy is, more-
From Foreign Office, 10th February 1879.