'File 1/A/38 II Negotiations with Bin Saud re: Eastern boundary of Saudi Arabia with Qatar & Trucial Oman.' [‎93r] (190/472)

3
w
1 5%
is iii|
lai;;'
certain
®Ni
^4;
^ pp.ii. ■
coii
Ac fit
rt,aill
) the a^
ist tie |
ts.
ce tat
r onld ill;
wiiti;
i been i
[Hestidf
1 have I
soutoi
he lip
id by k
i a straip
ley had I
jir aadl
iali. I:
is of ft
ring ii
discnssi®
tojusi:
ng an eii
s Gove®’
ersectioit
;eastwt
dsthetf
g^g shoft
Arabia^
in the 'f
testepfl
[ajesty ; !';
sedwas ' 1
it then
bring :
nients°i f
There
beea^'
no#
an mfl
act®
it#
.st #'* 1
as anxious as the Saudi Government to arrive at these facts, and they had now
obtained a great mass of material on the subject. The case hardly seemed one
in which an international commission could accomplish useful work in the
Ruba-al-Khali, where the population was sparse, wild and nomadic, and where
it would hardly be practicable to interrogate tribal leaders; moreover, before
the tribal situation was accepted as a basis it would be necessary to decide the
exact attribution of all the tribes in question. There were' too, other considera
tions besides that of tribal diras. Fuad Bey had virtually admitted this by
defending the Saudi claim to the Khor-al-Odeid at the first meeting on the
ground of its commercial importance to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Rendel and
Sir Andrew Ryan went on to express the view that the next stage in the negotia
tions should be the production by Fuad Bey (for consideration by His Majesty’s
Government) of the fullest possible information in support of his arguments
against the southern sector of the line proposed by His Majesty’s Government,
and of his contention that the line proposed in his memorandum of the 3rd April
(a line running on the south from the intersection of meridian 56° £. and
parallel 22 ° N. to the intersection of meridian 52° E. and parallel 17° N., thence
due west along parallel 17 until its intersection with the Anglo-Turkish ‘ £ violet ”
line) offered the fairest and most suitable boundary. It would be most convenient
if this information were to be supported by a map showing the limits of the
diras of the specific tribes claimed by the Saudi Government.
FUAD BEY replied that he could supply this information, if necessary,
though it would take a long time, as it could only be obtained in Arabia. For his
part he preferred the alternative course, namely, that His Majesty’s Government
should produce a detailed statement of their criticisms of the line which King
Abdul Aziz had proposed. This line had been evolved in accordance with the
request made by His Majesty’s Government in the preceding autumn for a
statement of the King’s claims. Much trouble had been taken to collect evidence
and to explore the tribal position, and he was convinced that the line was both
accurate and fair. King Abdul Aziz had not hesitated to make sacrifices on his
side where the facts did not warrant his maintaining his claims, and Fuad Bey
cited as an instance the abandonment of the Saudi claim to the Manahil,
Ahl Kathir and Muhara [Mahra] sub-tribes (branches of the Da’akeih tribe)
although when he had written is book about Arabia a couple of years ago he had
claimed them for Saudi Arabia. But no sooner had King Abdul Aziz complied
with the request of His Majesty’s Government and put forward a statement of
his claims, than His Majesty’s Government, without even replying to this or
stating their objections to it, had put forward an alternative, and quite
inadequate, counter-proposal of their own. This suggested that they had never
intended to take King Abdul Aziz’s proposals seriously, and were merely trying
to strike a bargain, instead of getting at the facts. It seemed to him only just
and reasonable that His Majesty’s Government should now give their views on the
line proposed by King Abdul Aziz, instead of pressing their own counter
suggestion and inviting him to offer his criticisms on it.
Mr. RENDEL regretted that he could not share Fuad Bey’s opinion as to
the next stage. It had been agreed that while negotiations were in progress no
emphasis would be laid on the fact that His Majesty’s Government regarded the
Anglo-Turkish Blue and Violet lines as defining the strict legal position in regard
to the frontier; but he felt bound to point out that the Anglo-Turkish lines
did, in fact, form the starting-point for the negotiations. His Majesty’s
Government had, however, made the most thorough enquiry as to the existing
facts, and, as a result, they were now offering important concessions in derogation
of the strict legal position; if the Saudi Government were not satisfied it seemed
clear, therefore, that it was for them to give their reasons. It was not a question
of criticising the proposals as a whole. The line could be divided into various
sectors. The sector from the Dohat-as-Salwa to Banaiyan had formed the subject
of very full discussion at the first meeting, and Mr. Rendel had explained in detail
the reasons for which His Majesty’s Government could not accept the claims of
King Abdul Aziz in this sector. As regards the corner of the line at Banaiyan,
he had already undertaken that Fuad Bey’s promised memorandum should be
carefully studied. They were now discussing the southern part of the frontier,
and as Fuad Bey was demurring to the proposals of His Majesty’s Government
in this sector of the line as well, it was surely for him to give his reasons and
/