'Future Policy on the Trucial Coast. Correspondence between the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (1929)' [‎101v] (4/10)

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2. Sir Lionel Haworth was of the opinion that the new Shaikh Shakbut would
rule for a considerably shorter period than the 18 months of his predecessor. Shaikh
Shakbut has, however, in spite of onr non-intervention, already nominally governed
Abu Dhabi for a longer period than Shaikh Saggar. 1 say “nominally governed,” as
during my recent visit to A bn Dhabi it was obvious that the real governor is the
murdering uncle, Shaikh Khalifa, who was treated with the greatest deference by all.
No Arab Shaikh would be classed as a first-class life by an insurance company, so it
is very unsafe to prophesy ; but so far as 1 can judge, there is no immediate prospect
of another change of rulers, provided Shaikh Shakbut does nothing contrary to the
wishes of his powerful uncle or the Junta, which exists in all these principalities.
I doubt whether Sir Lionel Haworth's proposal, that “ in the event of a Shaikh’s
being murdered, His Majesty’s Government will consult with the leading merchants
and others of Abu Dhabi and then recognise a Shaikh elected by them,” is a
real remedy.
I am of opinion that no “ removal ” takes place until the successor has assured
himself that the Junta will not be hostile to him. If 1 am right in my belief, the
reference to “the leading merchants and others” would merely be an appeal from
Otesar unto Caesar.
•3. I have discussed the subject of fratricide with those whose opinion is of value,
and 1 find that so long as it is confined to a Shaikhly family, it is looked upon as an
ordinary occurrence about which no sensible person will bother his head. Of course,
it is forbidden in the Quran, but that is a matter between the murderer and his
conscience.
One night there will be shouting in the town and some shots will be fired. The
citizens will close their doors and go to sleep. The next morning it will be given out
that the Shaikh is dead and has been succeeded by one of his relations.
It is generally a family affair pure and simple. One of the new Shaikh’s personal
retainers—usually a slave—may have been involved ; but in most cases the coup de
r/race has been administered by the new Shaikh himself, as others are diffident about
committing themselves to such an extent.
In the case of Shaikh Saggar the actual murderers appear to have been Manasir
Bedu, acting under the orders of Shaikh Saggar’s brother, Khalifa ; but otherwise it
is the same story.
Provided Shaikh Shakbut can keep the goodwill of his relatives by giving them
sufficient maintenance allowances and preserve the suppoit of the Junta, there is no
reason why he should not continue to rule Abu Dhabi.
4. The root of most of the fratricidal trouble is that although — thanks to the pearl
trade—the rulers are not paupers, they are poor, and the poverty of the State renders
it almost impossible for the ruler to satisfy the demands of his numerous relations.
The anxiety of Shaikh Hamad (ruler of the rich State of Bahrain) to satisfy all his
A1 Khalifa relatives—even those with whom he is not personally on good terms—is a
manifestation of the Arab rulers’ inherent dread of his relatives and anxiety to
conciliate them.
I am in absolute agreement with the views laid down by Sir Frederick Johnston
in para. 3 of his letter Xo. 133 S. of the 23rd April 1929.* Unless and until the
Government of India are prepared to interfere much more than they have done in the
past, and are prepared, if necessary, to bolster up a weak Shaikh, however much we
may regret it, the only course is to continue to shake hands with successful murder.
These Shaikhs are not Europeans nor products of modern civilisation, and we cannot
apply our standards to them.
The result of the policy of bolstering up weak Shaikhs is to be seen in Bahrain
and Muscat, and if Government decide to adopt it they must do so with their eyes
open to the consequences.
5. It is quite within the bounds of probability that the bigoted prejudice of the
Trucial Chiefs may force us to some policy of active interference in Trucial Oman A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. , if
we wish to establish our air service along this coast; but the time has not yet arrived
when 1 can recommend forcing ourselves on the Shaikhs regardless of consequences.
6. Sir Frederick Johnston further opines that in our dealings with these Chiefs
both interference and non-interference are carried in some matters to a greater degree
than is consistent with our interests.
* No. I, above.