'File 3/8 Affairs of Sh. Khaz`als sons.' [‎177v] (354/508)

8
Conf. 12004,
No. 175.
E 2003/2003/
34/1922.
E3121/6/34/
1922.
E4348/6/34/
1922.
E4931/6/34/
1922.
E5194/6/34/
1922.
E5379/6/34/
1922.
E 6771/6/34/
1922.
E7202/6/34/
1922.
E7259/6/34/
1922.
E7260/6/34/
1922.
early negotiations between the Sheikh and the Central Government, but the
position at the end of 1921 was briefly as follows:—
The Sheikh had paid no maliyat since 1913 but, on the other hand, was
claiming from the Persian Government sums which he had expended during
the war in maintaining law and order in Arabistan without any assistance
from the Persian Government. After prolonged negotiations, in which
His Majesty’s Legation at Tehran had lent support to the Sheikh, Vossugh-
ed-Dowleh had agreed to waive the payment of maliyat for the war period
and to accept a moiety for six years as from 1920. Unfortunately, matters
were not put on a formal basis and the Sheikh was not fully satisfied and
refused to continue payment. Qawam-es-Sultaneh stated that neither his
Government nor the Majlis would accept the settlement to which Vossugh-ed-
Dowleh had agreed, but had offered to waive the war-time revenues in
exchange for the payment in full as from 1920. To this, however, the Sheikh
would not agree unless arrangements were made by which the Persian
Government would meet part of the recurring expenditure in maintaining
law and order in Southern Arabistan, and when, earlv in 1922, proposals ^
to this effect were advanced, he would accept no compromise in spite of f
advice from His Majesty’s Legation at Tehran, who regarded the proposed i
terms as reasonable. *
-rj MnUers took a new turn in April, 1922, when it was learned that the
Persian Government proposed to send troops into Arabistan to compel the Sheikh
to pay his revenue. The Sheikh now asked for British intervention, appealing
to the assurances given to him and declaring t/hat the despatch of a small force
to Arabistan would lead to unrest and anarchy, with consequent loss to British
commercial interests. On learning of this, Sir P. Loraine requested the Political
Resident to see the Sheikh and speak to him seriously : the Sheikh had onlv
himself to blame, and while the British obligations to him were fully recognised
they were clearly not intended to protect him from discharging his obligations
to the Persian Government; the undesirability of the despatch of Persian troops
to Arabistan from the British point was also fully realised, but the Minister
ot War (who was responsible) was an opponent of the Bolsheviks and might
therefore prove an asset to His Majesty’s Government, and Sir P. Loraine did
not wish to take up a bad case with him; the first essential was, therefore thatU
the Sheikh should come to a reasonable settlement with the Persian Government
the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. , being unable himself to see the Sheikh, instructed His
Majesty s Consul at Ahwaz to impress upon the Sheikh that, if he desired British
? u PP or ^ m .accordance with the 1914 assurances, he must fulfil his obligations
to the Persian Government, among the first of which was the payment of revenue.
1 his produced what appeared to be a satisfactory settlement, the Sheikh
promising to pay two years arrears of revenue on being released from payments
nf thl g fl the Wai h J he ^ tter wa s n J>L however, finally settled as the actual amount
of the arrears had not been fixed, but early in June Sir P. Loraine thought that
the matter could be settled without his intervention and did not think that the
despatch of troops to Arabistan was likely to materialise.
The despatch of Persian troops to Arabistan, 1922.
t> the 18t ^ 192 ?’ Sir Loraine received information that they
ersian Government had despatched a force of 500 men for Arabistan and at once
caused representations to be made to the Minister of War and Prime Minister
calling attention to the possible resultant dangers to British interests. The Prime
Minister said that on grounds of prestige he could not recall the troops (which were
merely to form a bodyguard for the Governor at Shushtar) but expressed his and
Keza Khan s readiness to give formal assurances to the Sheikh that the troops
would not interfere with the Sheikh’s territory or the Arab tribes. On the same
day Sir P. Loraine sent for two leading Bakhtiari Khans, explaining the situation
and the action taken; it was agreed that the interests of the Bakhtiari the
Jieikh and His Majesty s Government were identical in this matter and that the
Bakhtians and the Sheikh should support the representations of His Majesty’s
Legation; the Khans proposed force, but Sir P. Loraine said that thm must
be absolutely the last resort and ought not to be necessary. The Foreign Office
were somewhat disturbed by the report of this interview and made it clear to
Sir P. Loraine that His Majesty’s Government must not committed to
embarrassing obligations towards the Bakhtians: Sir P. Loraine was instructed
to employ all his efforts to induce the Persian Government to abandon any intern
ti°n as regards Southern Arabistan, but was informed that there seemed to be