'Kohuk (supplementary note in continuation of memorandum of 10 December 1875)' [‎12r] (1/4)

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KOHUK.
[Supplementary Note in continuation of Memorandum of
10M December 1875.)
The Letter from the Grovernment of India, No. 200, of 14th October
1875, as well as the Foreign Office letter of the 29th November,
formed the subject of considerable discussion. A draft letter to the
Foreign Office, prepared by Sir H. Rawlinson, was approved by the
Political Committee on the 8th January 1876. This proposed that Her
Majesty’s Minister should announce to the Shah’s Government that
the line determined by the map and revised Note of 1873 would be
recognized by the British Government as the definitive frontier between
Persia and Khelat so soon as the documents were formally ratified.
Lord Salisbury, however, declined to accept the draft, and, on again
consulting the Government of India, received the following reply by
telegraph :—
Azad Khan, of Kharan, has been raiding in Kohuk ; he is virtually independent, but
owes nominal allegiance to Kabul. If we formally acknowledge Kohuk to be Persian
territory Persia may endeavour to hold Afghanistan responsible for him, and complications
will arise. Only safe course is that advised in our Despatch 200, dated 14th October
1875.
If Persia accepts modified boundary we have no intention to interfere in Kohuk, although
you cannot formally admit her right to it. If Persia does not acknowledge modified boundary
she is bound to the former agreement of 1871, and should evacuate Kohuk.
It may here be incidentally mentioned that, as a matter of fact, Kohuk
was occupied by the Persians in 1874.
Consequent on this further expression of the views of the Govern
ment of India, a new draft was drawn up under instructions from the
Secretary of State, the material paragraph of which was as follows:—
In reply 1 am directed to shite that, in Lord Salisbury’s judgment, the proposed transfer
of negotiations would not be convenient, and would not lead to an early or satisfactory
settlement of the question at issue. His Lordship is in communication with the Govern
ment of India on the subject, and trusts to obtain, without unnecessary delay, such further
information as will enable him to place Lord Derby in possession of his matured opinion as
to the course which should be adopted in the matter.
On this draft being laid before the Political Committee, Sir H.
Bawlinson recorded a further Note on the 10th February:—
Since this Despatch was drafted a telegram has been received from India, giving the
reasons of the Viceroy for objecting to the cession of Kohuk to Persia, as proposed in the
letter which passed the Political Committee on 6th of January, and what do these reasons
amount to? Simply that Azad Khan of Kharan, although virtually independent, owes a
nominal allegiance to Kabul, that he has been raiding in Kohuk aud may do so again, in
which case the Shah, if Kohuk has been declared Persian territory, may hold the Amir
responsible for the acts of bis nominal vassal, and complications may thus arise. But has
there ever been any indication of the Shah’s recognizing, or even being aware of, the pre
tended Afghan nationality of Azad Khan ? Is it not, on the contrary, notorious that he has
always been regarded as a Belooch feudatory of Khelat, which is indeed his true status ?
The dependence of Azad Khan on Kabul is a myth which really is not worth diplomatic
discussion.
And, on the other hand, if Persia were allowed by us to occupy Kohuk, and Azad Khan
after that occupation were to recommence his raids on the district, would not the Shah,
supposing him to have an inkling of the freebooter’s “ nominal allegiance,” be able to pick a
quarrel with the Amir on that account precisely the same as if Kohuk had been acknow
ledged to be Persian territory ?
It must be observed too that the Viceroy entirely overlooks the inconvenience of keeping
up irritation at Teheran on such a petty question as this dependency of Kohuk, and takes no
account of the advantage of placing the Shah under an obligation to England by yielding a
point which i-cally can signify nothing whatever either to us or our allies,
18719. I. 1695 ,