'Adminisistration [Administration] Reports 1931-1935' [‎151v] (302/416)

the- whole of his Northern tribes from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. would
have “ gone up
6 As usual however the Bedouin tribes could not co-operate, and each
wanted to wait and see what would happen in the South before deciding on any
thing.
7 Bin Sand sizing up the situation exactly, and haring his fingoi on the
mdse of his tribes as ever, acted in masterly fashion, when he saw that his rush
down the coast to Kodeida had not succeeded in bluffing Yahya into swing for
peace. He declared himself anxious to end the bloodshed between the
“ Musalmeen ” and ottered generous peace terms to Yemen.
8 Bin Sand succeeded in impressing the world with his magnanimity, but
in no wise did he deceive his own people or tribes, who one and all recognized
that in doing as he did, he had saved himself and the house of Sand from
.disaster.
9. Once again had the luck (hath) of the King come to his rescue.
10. The Shaikh of Kuwait, who would have liked to have seen Bin Saud
suffer a mild defeat or as he put it “ have some of the wind taken out of Ms
head ” was not a little relieved that complete disaster had not overtaken tlm
Kino*’s armies. For like everyone else in North East Arabia, he firmly believed
that "Bin Sand’s distant adventure was leading him straight to destruction.
11 In this connection it should never be forgotten, that although Kuwait
hates Bin Saud for his local anti-Kuwait “ Blockade measures ”, she yet
admires and looks up to him, as the great champion of the Musalmeen in the
world todav. In particular is he admired for the way he deals with the Euro
pean powers, and keeps them all wooing him, yet never letting them get to near
or too familiar. He is a second “ Saladin ” for the Arabs todaw
VII .—Relations with Iraq.
1. Officially these have been correct throughout the year, though unfortu
nately the dlst of December 1924 saw the famous “ Date Gardens question”
still unsettled. One still hopes however that 1935 will see the end of the sad
business which has done so much to acerbate Kuwa't feeling against her
northern neighbour and to strain her old loyal and affectionate feeling for the
British connection to near breaking point.
Full details and reports on the measures and counter measures taken by
both sides in the light for these gardens will be found elsewhere.
2. 1934 saw also the second “ big push ” of the Iraq Government (in their
political campaign against Kuwait) develop and come to a head. One refers
to their “ anti-smuggling ” attack.
Briefly, Iraq, following the lead of Persia, had raised her sea Customs tariff
to such a dizzy height that smuggling was bound to occur on all her borders.
Kuwait with her low Customs tariff, fixed many y-ears ago, to enable her
to compete with Bahrain, Dabai, etc., in the common and natural desire to sup
ply the Bedouin world of Arabia with their wants, naturally became a cheap
and sought-after market for the Iraq nomad population. These latter financed
and assisted by the river tribes of the Euphrates had found it clearlv to their
advantage during the existing hard times, to come down to Kuwait and do their
shopping.
3. Iraq took objection to this and reouested Kuwait to prevent her
tribesmen entering Kuwait territory, or failing this, to accept an official (>
whose pay would come from Iraq) to act as her Customs Director, whose busi
ness, among others, would be to fix a tfhde quota of imports sufficient for the
needs of the Kuwait population.
4. Kuwait’s reply is that, she has just as much right to try and develop her
small and meagre trade with the outside world as her big neighbour has, and
that to accede to Iraq’s request even if it were possible to do so, would l> e
tantamount to asking her to commit political suicide.
o. Clearly Iraq’s honest and only course is to place a line of Customs posts
on her frontier, and by a system of tribal and police patrols to herself stop the