File 345/1908 Pt 1 'Mohammerah: situation. British assurances to Sheikh.' [‎156r] (316/416)

therefore, appear to be to bring Muscat, at the forthcoming Conference, within the
scope of the Brussels Act of 1890, and to enforce there the provisions requiring the
estabdsr.ment of a warehouse under proper supervision.
If this is done, two questions will arise:—
(e.) hat inducement shall be offered to the Sultan, a Sovereign whose indepen-
dence has been guaranteed by Great Britain and France, to accept restrictions on a
w traffic amounting to 112,338/. • per annum, and yielding a customs revenue of *5,617£r
per annum ?
(fr.) How will it be possible to provide efficient machinery for carrying out the
provisions of the Act, without admitting a system of international control inconsistent
with the maintenance of the present political predominance of Great Britain ?
The control of the arms traffic would presumably be vested in the Sultan’s
Customs Department. There is thus afforded an additional argument in favour of the
Government of India’s proposals,! renewed during the present year, that they should
acquire the control of the Customs Administration of Muscat, guaranteeing the Sultan
a minimum income of 20,000 dollars per mensem (25,600/. per annum at the rate of
exchange current in 1907). It has been suggested that a suitable compensation to the
Sultan for the loss of income entailed by the prohibition of the arms traffic would be
to double the present subsidy he receives from Indian revenues (5,760/. per annum),
and to raise it gradually, as may be necessary, to 15,000/. per annum. It is to be
feared that if other Powers contribute towards the compensation paid to His Highness,
they will obtain a locus standi for interference in the Muscat Customs Administration,
which would constitute a serious disturbance of the status quo.
2. Bahrein. —On the 30th April, 1898, the Sheikh of Bahrein, on the advice of the
Resident in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , agreed “ absolutely to prohibit the importation of arms
into Bahrein territory or exportation therefrom ”; and to enforce the prohibition, he
issued on the same day—
( 1 .) A Notification declaring that the import and export of arms into and from
the Islands of Bahrein was absolutely forbidden, and that in future all arms and
ammunition imported or exported would be seized and confiscated as property of the
State.
(2.) A Proclamation conferring on British and Persian vessels of war permission
to search vessels carrying the British, Persian, or Bahrein flag in Bahrein territorial
waters, as well as Bahrein vessels in Indian or Persian waters, and to confiscate all
arms and ammunition (weapons of war) intended for Indian or Persian ports, or for
the Islands of Bahrein.
The effect of the prohibition at Bahrein was at once perceptible in the customs
returns, the total value of the imports of arms and ammunition, which had amounted
to 30,819/. in 1897, falling to 313/. in the following year. In October 1905 the Sheikh
of Bahrein addressed a Memorial to the Government of India, in which, among other
alleged grievances, he complained of the fact that he was ooliged to interdict the sale
of arms, and was thereby deprived of an advantage enjoyed by all the Arab Chiefs
along the Arabian coast. He was informed in reply, in May 1906, that the restriction
on the importation of arms at Bahrein had first been imposed in 1895 by himself on
his o^n initiative, and his attention was drawn to the measures he had himself
spontaneously taken from time to time to stop the traffic. It was also pointed out to
him that the Sheikh of Koweit and the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. had similarly
prohibited the traffic of arms in their territory, and he was given to understand that
the Government of India would not consider for a moment the possibility of
cancelling or modifying the Agreement he had concluded with the British Govern
ment on this point.
There seems good reason to believe that a considerable amount of illicit arms
traffic goes on at Bahrein. Writing in December 1906, Major Cox furnished evidence
that the port was rapidly rising to importance as a centre of the trade. The business
in arms there, hitherto confined to one dealer, had been taken over by a Company,
two of the shareholders being friends of Sheikh Esa and opponents of customs
reform. He added Hi at the business had been largely extended, and Bahrein was
being used as a distribution centre for supplying Persia.
* Value of im portsJ bf arms and ammunition in iy 06 - 7 ; b-fiMt. represents 6 per cent, (the amount of
the customs duty'tit Muscat) on this sum.
f See pp. 14 , 15 of Foreign Office Memorandum of the 12 th February, 1908 .
Viceroy’s
telegram of
February
13 , 1908 .
Govern
ment of
India’s
letter of
July 7 ,
1898 .
Govern
ment of
India’s
letter of
May 31 ,
190 G.
Major Cox
to Govern
ment of
India,
December
2 , 1906 .