File 345/1908 Pt 2 'Mohammerah: situation. Sheikh's dispute with the Vali of Basra. decoration for Sheikh. renewed assurances to Sheikh.' [‎167r] (338/566)

as could be seen from the reports of our officers, afforded no justification for the vali’s
sudden change of attitude towards the sheikh. In fact, the unjustifiability of the
vali’s proceedings, on the facts of which we were in possession, was a necessary premise
to my attitude both in this telegram and in my later No. 569.
(iii.) The expediency of effecting Nazif Bey's recall.
As to the degree of difficulty involved to His Majesty’s Embassy or Government
in advising or urging the Porte to change a particular vali, I quite recognise that you
had full personal knowledge while I have none. I could only urge reasons which, from
a local standpoint, seemed to me to demonstrate the expediency of the course advocated,
both on the sheikh’s account and in our own interests. On the sheikh’s account
because, on the information before me, whether from Bussorah or Mohammerah the
aggression of the vali seemed deliberate and uncalled-for, and because, human nature
being what it is, it was not conceivable to me that after what had happened his
relations with Nazif Bey could ever again be sincere or satisfactory.
In our own interests because, apart from the general tendency with which he
credits most Turkish officials of the new regime, Mr. Crow had described Nazif Bey
as being personally impetuous, inexperienced as a governor, and most undiplomatic ;
and also because in the short time during which the latter held office he had
displayed an attitude of mind actively and specifically opposed to our interests and
policy at the head of the Gulf, as the following instances will demonstrate :—
(a.) As regards Koweit and Mohammerah. —Both publicly and privately Nazif Bey
has declined to admit any right on the part of our consulate at Bussorah to discuss
with him matters concerning either port, and he is reported to have expressed publicly,
on several occasions, his resentment at British interference in Koweit affairs in the past
and his determination not to put up with it in future. We further know from
independent sources that he has been making overtures to the Sheikh of Koweit
in order to induce him to admit a Turkish telegraph-office in Koweit connected by
land-line with Bussorah or Fao ; and, on another occasion, to allow Koweit subjects to
be enlisted in the Hasa gendarmerie.
(b.) As regards Bahrein. —Although instructed from Constantinople not to protest
actively against our assertion of protective rights over the principality, speaking for
himself, Nazif Bey “ emphatically stated that he could not admit that the British
Government had any rights of supremacy over Bahrein ” [vide enclosure to embassy
despatch No. 6980, dated the 28th February, 1910, to His Majesty’s Foreign Office).
(c.) As regards Baluchistan. —1 have it from His Majesty’s consul, Mohammerah,
that a few days after taking up his post Nazif Bey issued a notification in Bussorah to
the effect that Baluchistan being an independent state, the pretensions of foreign
Powers to protect Baluchis would under no circumstances be recognised, and that
they would be treated as Turkish subjects. Mr. Wilson understands that this question
is under reference to His Majesty’s Embassy.
It is true that a new vali might have been equally aggressive, equally inclined
perhaps to pursue a policy opposed to our interests, but I think the probabilit}? rather
is that he would have been less assertive, while it is hardly possible that he could have
been more so.
I find it difficult to understand Mr. Crow’s view that the recall of the vali would
endanger the security of the river. Sheikh Khazal has been entirely amenable to our
advice and guidance throughout his recent troubles with the vali, and but for that fact
the vali’s action at Zain would certainly have been followed by a rising of Arabs and
consequent insecurity on the river. Had the present vali been replaced at our instance
by a less aggressive man, the sheikh would have recognised the value of our mediation,
and would have had no interest of his own to serve, still less excuse to give us, for
disregarding our guidance and lending his ear to the overtures which he received from the
restless Arab element on the river. It will be noted from Lieutenant Wilson’s report that
these were by no means lacking.
(iv.) The question of Policy involved.
His Majesty’s Government have had difficulty in forming a definite opinion on the
actual situation owing to the fact that the views of His Majesty’s consul, Bussorah, and
myself, on the subject, were opposed.