File 2182/1913 Pt 11 'Arabia: relations with BIN SAUD Hedjaz-Nejd Dispute' [‎314r] (182/678)

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^ t ^ ie February the Foreigu Office received a copy of a telegram of the (176825)
l^t February from the Civil Commipsioner, Baghdad, in which he explained that for the
past five years the relations of His Majesty’s Government with Ibn Sand had been
marked by the frequent exchange of personal letters between the latter and the Civil
Commissioner, Baghdad. News of the state of affairs in Syria reached Ibn Saud very
xapidly, and in a form that would generally be wholly unfavourable both to His
Majesty s Government, to the French and to the Shenf Feisal. He explained the
passages in his letter to which the High Commissioner at Cairo had taken exception,
by saying that it appeared to him preferable that Ibn Saud should receive from the
Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, early, even if not authoritative, news of current events,
and that it was entirely to our interests and to those of the peace of Arabia that he
should not feel that the representatives of His Majesty’s Government, with whom he
was m diplomatic relations, had been withholding news from him (see 170356 above).
. t ^ e 1th February the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. expressed the opinion that Hussein should (H. 9)
be informed of the statement made by the Nejd delegation to Captain Bray denvin^
forcible conversion by the Akhwan movement (see 173436).
On the 14th February the Foreign Office enquired whether the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. (176825)
considered the explanation offered by the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, of the
expressions used in his letter to Ibn Saud satisfactory.
On the 16th February the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. informed the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, (E. 6U)
that the Admiralty had instructed the Naval Commander-in-chief, as requested by
him, but that they considered it unlikely that he could spare a ship, and suggested
that a Royal Indian Marine vessel might be lent by the Government of India if Ibn
Saud could not travel by ordinary steamer.
On the 18th February the loreign Office received copies of three telegrams of the (E 235)
l^th February from the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad. In the first of these he
reported instiuctions given by him to the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , Bahrein, in regard to his
with Ibn baud. In the second he reported the nature of a communication
which Ibn Saud had made to the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. . This was to the effect that Hussein
had decided to utilise an alleged movement in Syria towards Jihad, in order to reinstate
himself m the eyes of the Moslem world, and at the same time to discredit Ibn Saud.
He said that Hussein had sent an emissary to Syria with instructions as follows :
kirstly, that a Jihad should be proclaimed in Syria in the first place; in the event of
the people of Syria being reluctant to act, the aid of the Turks should be invoked.
Secondly, an invitation should be sent from Syria to Ibn Saud to lead the Jihad
movement m his capacity as avowed champion of Islam. Thirdly, on the declaration
of theJihad, action was to be directed, in the first place, against the French in Syria,
and then against Mesopotamia. It was hoped that Ibn Saud would co-operate against
Mesopotamia. Ibn Saud said that it was obvious that the Sherif hoped that he would
be placed by t%above manoeuvre on the horns of a dilemma—if he joined the move
ment he would/mieirate British support; if he held aloof the people of Nejd, to whom
^ro.g appeal would be made, would turn against him. He urged as a vital necessity
that the following action should be taken at once
1. His Majesty s Government to guarantee at once in writing the maintenance of
the existing status quo on the Fejd-Hejaz frontier.
2. His Majesty’s Government to guarantee at once in writing, that the Sherif
would refrain from an aggressive policy.
3. The Mecca and Medina pilgrimage to be open to the people of Nejd and the
safety of the Nejd pilgrims, whilst in the Ilejaz, to be assured.
Pie undertook to guarantee that if the above undertakings were given by His
Majesty s Government the peace of Arabia, so far as he was concerned, was assured,
and neither incitement to J*diid nor Syrian intrigues would have the slightest effect on
his people.
In the third telegram the Civil Commissioner stated that he had now despatched
the message contained in India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. telegram of the 24th January. He had also
instructed the lolitical Agent, Bahrein, that, should Ibn Saud definitely negative the
Kiea of visiting Hussein by sea at Jeddah, he should sound him whether he would be
willing to meet him at some other place, such as Cairo or Aden. With regard to Ibn
Saud s icquests, he said that he regarded Ibn Saud as being by far the strongest man
in Arabia at present, and the least likely to lose his influence by reason of his attitude
towards his Majesty’s Government. He considered his goodwill even more important
now to His Majesty’s Government than that of King Hussein. The only solution he
could see was that Ibn Saud should be informed in writing that Article 2 of the Treaty
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