Coll 6/2 'Hejaz-Nejd: Italo-Hejaz-Nejd Treaty and Relations. Attitude of Saudi Govt during Italo-Ethiopian Dispute.' [‎26r] (52/368)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOYfe^NMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
June 8, 1936.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 3322/56/25]
Section 2.
Copy No
. 109
Sir A. Ryan to Mr. Eden.—{Received June 8.)
(No. 146. Confidential.)
Sir, Jedda, May 17, 1936.
IN my telegram No. 63 of the 13th May, I had the honour to submit a
summary of the account given me by Sheikh Yusuf Yasin of the visit of my Italian
colleague to Ibn Saud’s camp at Ashaira on the 10th May and of what passed
between M. Persico and the King. I do not think it necessary to send you a full
record of my conversation with Sheikh Yusuf, but I may supplement my telegram
by mentioning three points of some importance which I omitted from it, as
follows :—
{a) My Italian colleague, according to Sheikh Tusuf, began his statement to
the King by thanking him for having observed neutrality in the Italo-
Abyssinian war and for not having taken part in sanctions. The King
replied that he had adopted his attitude for the sake of friendship
with all concerned.
{b) M. Persico stressed the friendly dispositions of his Government towards
the Arab nations and their readiness to give any required assurances
in this respect.
(c) At the end of the private conversation, in which the sheikh engaged me
after he had carried out his instructions to inform me of what had
passed at Ashaira, he threw out a question regarding reports that His
Majesty’s Government might withdraw from the League of Nations
and regarding the consequences of such a step, if it were taken. 2 3 4
2. I did not comment on {a) or {b) above. As regards (c), I took the general
line that I knew of no pronouncement by any responsible person which could lend
support to the reports in question; that many people, it was true, thought that
the League should be reorganised to make it more useful; but that, whatever
happened (and no one could foresee what would happen), it would astonish me
greatly if Great Britain abandoned or despaired of the League. I adduced
various considerations in support of my opinion, making it clear, of course, that
I was only expressing my private views as between two friends, in accordance with
Sheikh Yusuf’s request.
3. Mr. Philby, who was at Ashaira during M. Persico’s visit, spent the
evening at my house on the 13th May. His account of the audience, based on what
he had heard from his friends, and 'possibly from the King himself, was generally
similar to that given me by Sheikh Yusuf, though not so complete and more loosely
put together. He was even more outspoken than the sheikh about the perturbation
caused in the King’s mind by the outcome of the Italo-Abyssinian war. The reason
for the King’s reaction was, he said, his concern for British prestige. I could
not get him to say definitely why the maintenance of that prestige should interest
the King so greatly, but the implications of his language were clearly these :
Reliance on Great Britain was the corner-stone of Ibn Saud’s policy. Great
Britain had failed to oppose a successful resistance to Italy in the case of
Abyssinia and had, in fact, let that country down. How, then, could the King
have confidence in the will or ability of His Majesty’s Government to resist Italian
ambitions in the Red Sea? Like Sheikh Yusuf, Mr. Philby spoke particularly of
the Yemen, saying that, when referring to the intended negotiations between Italy
and the Yemen, my Italian colleague had spoken of a strengthening ” of the
relations between the two countries.
4. Mr. Philby is, as you are aware, not in the innermost secrets of Ibn Sand,
and his language is very apt to be coloured by his personal sentiments.
Nevertheless, I think that what he told me on the 13th May faithfully represents
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