File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎62r] (119/420)

Question of Capture of Hail.
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Ibn Sa’ud says that is a very big matter. He and his forbears have been
lighting for the past 40 years with this object in view, the net result being nil after
^ alternations of partial successes with severe disasters. Never have they been within
sight of the concpiest of Hail and the Shammar. The strength of this tribe lies in
several factors which-it is important to remember. To begin with, they are a single
united tribe ; secondly, Ibn Rashid is himself a Shammar Shaikh ; thirdly, Hail can
always count upon- the support of the Turkish Government, assistance 'which is always
close at hand. Ibn Rashid has received much encouragement from the Turks during
tlie war, and much money and arms and even soldiers to garrison Hail. As long as
the Turks hold Medinah and the railway, Ibn Rashid’s position must always be
strong. He has lately been with Fakl^t) Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. in Medinah and has probably received
fresh subsidies. Added to all this, the Shammar are stiff fighters and are always
ready to take on superior numbers of mixed Najd clans. They are redoubtable
antagonists, and if in full force, as they might be were any serious attempt made
upon Hail, it is very doubtful if any combination of tribes could defeat them, at least
on or near Jabal Shammar. And failing a coup <lc main, there would probably ensue
a desultory siege of town and hills. The Turks might render relief, and in any case,
unsupported by regular troops, it is sure that a loosely held-together Peduin
confederation would soon tire of the job and break up.
Ibn Sa’ud thinks that the economic lever applied by means of a strict blockade
would be the most effectual means of bringing the Shammar over. This, however, he •
realises, with the Aslam and other sections being exempt themselves and engaged all
the time in blockade running, is scarcely practicable. If we treated all the Shammar
as a corporate body, and refused to have any further relations with Ibn Tuwalah and
other sections now posing as friendly until the whole tribe submitted, there is not the
slightest doubt that the Shammar would be isolated to such an extent that they would
have no alternative to surrender. The screw must, similarly, be put on the ’Anizah,
i.c., they must be treated not by sections but as a corporate whole. Ibn Sa’ud
suggests that a larger share in the control of Central Arabian traffic should be in his
hands; that he should have agents at each of the chief market towns under British
occupation or suzerainty ; and that these agents should be consulted before any export
passes are granted,
IV.
Attitude towards King Husain.
Ibn Sa’ud is consumed with jealousy of Sharif Husain, King of the Hijuz, and
this jealousy has lately Teen fanned to a white heat by the latter’s assumption of the
title of King of Arabia (Malak al diyar, or, bilad al Arab;. Ihe Sharif has been
receiving large subsidies from us, and has gathered round him not only all tne clans
of the Hijaz and neighbouring districts, but has also drawn to his side all the
’Ataibah and Harb, tribes -which Ibn Sa’ud claims as belonging to him. Latterly
large numbers of ’Acjad or Najd townsmen attracted by high pay have levanted to
the Sharif from ’Anaizah, Buraidah, Sharah, and Midhnib. These ’Aqail. represent
some of the best fighting stock in the country. 1 he Amirs of Anaizah and Midhnib
assured me that no less than 4,000 of them had joined the Shaiifs loices fiom
Qasim alone, and these do not include Beduin.
In the course of conversation Ibn Sa’ud has frecpiently appealed loi equality^ o
treatment with the Sharif. He hints that we have left him m the_ cold while doing
everything for his rival. He complains that we have not given him due credit for
his espousal of our cause and uncompromising hostility towards the lurks: he even
claims credit for the fact that, but for his benevolent attitude tow aid tbe Shan I and
his holding the Shammar in check, the former’s rebellion would have had no chance of
success. He said that he had resisted many tempting offers from the Links who. wen,
always attempting to reopen negotiations with him. As proof of this lattei stateanent
he showed me a letter from Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , Commandant at Medinah, asking him why he
had not replied to his friendly Letter of the year previous. I saw also the letter
referred to. Both appeared to be quite genuine. If he has been carrying on any
intrigue it has been with Fakhri Pasha’s superiors at Damascus or elsewhere. It
is rumoured and universally believed that he has received subsidies from the lurks,
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