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File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎62v] (120/420)

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The record is made up of 1 item (206 folios). It was created in 4 Jan 1918-7 Aug 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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find while marching through Woshm I was told hat a party of nine .mhs.
German officers had just cleared out of Riyadh and passed me neai ^ »
the opposite direction. This 1 hardly think likely ; m fact, it is aery ■<
though some of Ihn Sa’ud’s entourage are pro-1 uii, or a, <ui\ o < . ■ ,
policy of hedging against a possible return ot the Ottoman Government It is not an
uncommon occurrence, as we have found m Mesopotamia also, that wheie theie aie
two rival Shaikhs or sections, and one is for us, the other turns pro-link. In the case
of Ibn Sa'ml and the Sharif we have befriended both, though natuially doing most for
the Sharif who has rendered such great services to the cause ibn Sa ud, however
thinks we should treat both equally. His mind harps on the ques ion of the pos
Ullum conditions and oscillates distressfully between the disadvantages that will
accrue to him according as the war should result in the victory of the Allies or the
Central Powers. We have sometimes thought that his possession ot iiasa, which is
of such great importance to his Emirate, from which he expelled the Piirks a short
time before the war, would be an overwhelming argument m our favour : that he
could only hope to keep it by holding on to our skirts. Put such, 1 am reliaWy
informed, is not really the case. Whichever side should wm, he does not believe he
will he allowed to hold on to Hasa for long, m view of the well-known cupidity and
acquisitiveness of great Powers. What is certain is that, should the Allies win and
tpg Turks be driven out of Aralha, he will have the mortification of linding bis n\al
the Sharif firmly established as an influential and powerful monarch able to count on
the support of Great Britain and the Mahommedan world, while he (Ibn Sa’ud)
remains a mere Beduin chieftain—as he was before the war—but with the Shammar
and Northern ’Anizali irretrievably lost and the Sharif claiming overlordship over the
border tribes. If, on the other hand, the Central Powers conquer, as he thinks they
will, he will have the satisfaction of seeing King Husain go down, while as regards
his own position he relies on his political acumen to drive some sort of bargain with
the Turks.
This does not mean that Ibn Sa’ud is pro-Turk. He hates the 1 urk as his
ancestors did and he likes and admires the British, infidels though they are. But it
is a matter of policy, and when policy is concerned he must regard the matter
entirely from the point of view of self-interest, v.e., the interests of his dynasty and
the Wahabi faith. He will not he induced to take any action unless the object is
justified primarily in these interests ; in other words he has got it into his head that
he is not going to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for us or for anyone. This is
perhaps the reason that Ibn Sa’ud has not attempted seriously to take Hail or performed
any noteworthy feat during the war. He hopes that, when our subsidies cease, the
tribes now supporting the Sharif will return to their former allegiance. He says that
the Sharif is already on bad terms with some of the Harb and told me one day with
manifest elation that the Baqhah section of the ’Ataibahhad been converted in a body
to the “ Ikhwan,” a religions brotherhocd which Ibn Sa’ud is fostering to the utmost
of his ability.
If the view of Ibn Sa’ud’s policy which 1 have endeavoured to set down is correct,
it can he seen how foolish it would be to expect any thorough going co-operation from
him even if more liberally subsidised. Indeed it is quite probable that any additional
subsidies we may give him would be used to buy back Harb and ’Ataibah Chiefs who
are now with the Sharif. The only means f can think of that would induce him to
undertake a big movement on our behalf would be to give him assurances regarding
his future boundaries, both territorial and tribal, and to satisfy him as to his personal
status as a Prince vis-a-vis the King of the Hijaz ; after which the sinews of war,
mbneE and arms, would have to bo given with a liberal hand. What could he then
give as his part of the bargain? From my observation of the esteem in which
‘ Abdul ’Aziz is held in Central and South Central Arabia, I believe that he could, if
he chose to put his heart into it, raise the whole country.
V. .
Ibn Sa’ud’s Desiderata.
The following conditions would completely satisfy Ibn Sa’ud :—
(1.) That we should observe towards him the same policy of trust and confidence
as we pursue in the case of the Sharif.
(2.) Treating him on an equality with the Sharif, we should acknowledge his
hegemony in Najd, Central Arabia and its dependencies and, as we have conceded the

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Part 7 primarily concerns relations between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hedjaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz].

It includes discussion as to whether Britain should provide Bin Saud with military assistance to enable him to take decisive action against Bin Rashid (also referred to as Ibn Rashid) [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd, Emir of Ha'il]. The policy advocated by the Government of India is that Bin Saud should be 'kept in play' by gifts of money but that arms and military instructors should be supplied sparingly. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Zachariah Cox and Harry St John Bridger Philby, on the other hand, favour an offensive against Hail [Ha'il] by Bin Saud, with British assistance. Also included are the following:

  • a memorandum from the War Cabinet's Middle East Committee, on the position of Bin Rashid in relation to other Arab rulers;
  • a note entitled 'Relations With Ibn Sa'ud', prepared by the Arab Bureau's Irak [Iraq] section, which provides a British perspective on Britain's relations with Bin Saud from 1899 onwards;
  • notes on conversations held between Colonel Cyril Edward Wilson and Major Kinahan Cornwallis of the Arab Bureau, and Emir Abdulla [ʿAbdullāh bin al-Ḥusayn], son of King Hussein, during December 1917;
  • a copy of a report by David George Hogarth on his interviews with King Hussein at Jeddah;
  • a memorandum from the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Kuwait, Colonel Robert Edward Archibald Hamilton, which is primarily concerned with relations between Kuwait and Riyadh;
  • notes by Hamilton on Bin Saud, based on conversations with the latter at Riyadh in November 1917;
  • correspondence between British officials regarding King Hussein's attempt to reoccupy Khurma and its impact on his relations with Bin Saud.

This item features the following principal correspondents:

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File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎62v] (120/420), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/389/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100032845621.0x000082> [accessed 29 March 2024]

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