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File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎79v] (154/420)

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The record is made up of 1 item (206 folios). It was created in 4 Jan 1918-7 Aug 1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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secured it, overran the Hasa, ejected without difficulty the small Turkisli
garrisons and established himself on the coast at Qatif and Ojair. Captain
Shakespear, on his return to England in June 1914 from a long projected
journey across Arabia, in the course of which he had visited Riyadh, bore
witness to the strong personal domination which Ibn Sa’ud’s vigorous and
commanding personality had established, and from other reports it was
clear that he was regarded beyond liis own frontiers as the coming man.
He proved more than a match for the ineffective efforts of the Turks to
retake the Hasa : they resorted to diplomacy and opened negotiations with
him through Saiyid Talib of Basrah. Early in May Tal’at Beg had
formulated in private conversation at the British Embassy the expectations
of the Ottoman Government in terms which seemed to his hearers little
consonant with actual conditions. He proposed to establish a strictly
delimited frontier between Ibn Sa’ud and Ibn Rashid, place representatives
of the Sultan at Riyadh and at Hail, and rely upon the guile of these
officials to control without the aid of force the actions of the two Amirs. As
for the Hasa, Ibn Sa’ud would be appointed Mutasarrif of the province, but
the collection of the Customs would remain in Turkish hands and Turkish
garrisons would be replaced in the ports.
3. Nothing was more certain than that Ibn Sa’ud’s appearance on the coast
must ultimately bring him into direct contact with ourselves, whether we
welcomed it or sought to avoid it ; and this anxiety underlay and possibly
accelerated the action of the Porte. But at the moment Turkish fears were
groundless. We were concerned wholly with the conclusion of prolonged
negotiations with Constantinople, touching interests in Mesopotamia and the
Gulf which were of vital importance, and were less inclined, if possible,
than before for Arabian adventure. We made a friendly offer of mediation
which was refused, and when in April 1914 the Amir met the British Agent,
Colonel Grey, outside Kuwait, lie was given to understand that we had
recently concluded a comprehensive agreement with Turkey and could hold
out to him no hope of support. Ibn Sa’ud was thrown back on his own
resources, but these were considerable, and the secret treaty which was
signed in May by himself and the Wall of Basrah fell short of Tal’at Beg’s
anticipations. He accepted the title of Wall and Military Commandant of
Najd which was offered to himself and his descendants as long as they
should remain loyal, and engaged to fly the Turkish flag, but he was to have
charge of the Customs on behalf of the Ottoman Government, raise his
own levies and provide the garrisons for Qatif and Ojair. Deficiencies in
the Najd budget were to be met from the Customs, and no revenue from any
local income was to be paid to Constantinople until such time aS there was
a surplus, an eventuality of doubtful occurrence. But while exercising in his
own terfitories an authority which was in all but the name that of an inde
pendent ruler, his correspondence with foreign Powers was to be conducted
solely through the Porte, and in case of war he was to come to the assistance
of the Sultan.
4. What would have been the upshot of a treaty which so imperfectly
reflected the convictions of the contracting parties can scarcely, admit of
doubt. The guiding trait of Ibn Sa’ud’s character is what must’be called a
lacial rather than a national patriotism, but this sentiment was not likely to
evoke sympathetic consideration from the leaders of the Committee of Union
and Progress, who were blindly determined on the Ottomanization of the
Arabs. As a strict Wahabi, the new Wali of Najd looked with abhorrence
on the loose religious principles of the Turks and was far from admitting
-their pretensions to represent and direct Islam. He had, in conversation
with Captain Shakespear, spoken with unexpected vehemence on this point,
saying that in his eyes the Infidel was preferable to the Turk, since the
latter broke the rule he professed to follow while the former acted in
accordance with his own law : and to the same listener he declared that he
had accepted the terms of the agreement only because he was assured
privately that even the small measure of sovereignty accorded to Turkey
would never be claimed. The Kuwait treaty was put to the test bv the
outbreak of European war and found wanting.

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Part 7 primarily concerns relations between Bin Saud [‘Abd al-‘Azīz bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Sa‘ūd] and King Hussein of Hedjaz [Ḥusayn bin ‘Alī al-Hāshimī, King of Hejaz].

It includes discussion as to whether Britain should provide Bin Saud with military assistance to enable him to take decisive action against Bin Rashid (also referred to as Ibn Rashid) [Saʿūd bin ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Rashīd, Emir of Ha'il]. The policy advocated by the Government of India is that Bin Saud should be 'kept in play' by gifts of money but that arms and military instructors should be supplied sparingly. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Zachariah Cox and Harry St John Bridger Philby, on the other hand, favour an offensive against Hail [Ha'il] by Bin Saud, with British assistance. Also included are the following:

  • a memorandum from the War Cabinet's Middle East Committee, on the position of Bin Rashid in relation to other Arab rulers;
  • a note entitled 'Relations With Ibn Sa'ud', prepared by the Arab Bureau's Irak [Iraq] section, which provides a British perspective on Britain's relations with Bin Saud from 1899 onwards;
  • notes on conversations held between Colonel Cyril Edward Wilson and Major Kinahan Cornwallis of the Arab Bureau, and Emir Abdulla [ʿAbdullāh bin al-Ḥusayn], son of King Hussein, during December 1917;
  • a copy of a report by David George Hogarth on his interviews with King Hussein at Jeddah;
  • a memorandum from the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Kuwait, Colonel Robert Edward Archibald Hamilton, which is primarily concerned with relations between Kuwait and Riyadh;
  • notes by Hamilton on Bin Saud, based on conversations with the latter at Riyadh in November 1917;
  • correspondence between British officials regarding King Hussein's attempt to reoccupy Khurma and its impact on his relations with Bin Saud.

This item features the following principal correspondents:

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File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎79v] (154/420), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/389/1, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100032845621.0x0000a4> [accessed 23 April 2024]

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