File 2182/1913 Pt 7 'Arabia: Policy toward Ibn Saud' [‎83r] (161/420)

the pale of Islam by the iniquities which they had committed on other
Moslems. He contrasted their policy with that of Great Britain, pointing
out that the Turks had sought to weaken the Arabs by fomenting their
differences,-whereas the British Government encouraged them to unite in
their own interest. He praised the action of the Sharif, and urged the
obligation of all true Arabs to co-operate with him in forwarding the Arab
cause. When he had brought his speech to an eloquent close, the three
chiefs, Kuwait, Muhammarah, and Ibn Sa’ud, swore together that they would
work with us for the achievement of a common end.
21. This scene made a deep impression on the local notables and on the
Beduin Shaikhs present, who will, no doubt, carry the tale far and wide.
During the receptions at Kuwait, Ibn Sa’ud showed in all his utterances how
clearly he had grasped the principle which guides our relations with Arabia.
He quoted as an example of Our benevolent policy towards the Arab cause
the fact that we were ready even to promote a reconciliation between himself
and Ibn Rashid if the latter would abandon his attitude of hostility. The
arrival of Ibn Fara’ud’s TOO tine camels, each branded with the wasm of
that well-known dealer, gave a dramatic completeness to the Kuwait
gathering.
22. From Kuwait Ibn Sa’ud went to Muhammarah as the guest of Shaikh
Khaz’al, who co-operated most heartily in the endeavour to make Ibn Sa’ud’s
visit profitable to him. The two chiefs arrived at Basrah on the evening of
26th November. Early next morning the Chief Political Officer, accom
panied by the two chief military representatives of the Army Commander
present in Basrah, went on board the Shaikh’s launch and presented Ibn
Sa’ud with a sword of honour and a message of welcome from the Army
Commander. The day was spent m exhibiting to him the base camps and
.organisation and the latest machinery of warfare, including the aircraft, in
which he took an eager interest. Dhari ibn Twalah and Humud al Suwait,
Shaikhs of the Shammar A slam and the Dhaffr, were present, while Shaikh
Ibrahim oi Zubair and several Sunni notables of Basrah and refugees from
Baghdad had an audience with Ibn Sa’ud on the launch.
23. The Kuwait Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). and Ibn Sa’ud’s visit to Basrah have placed us in a
singularly strong position. Three powerful chiefs have made public piotes-
tation of their friendship with each other and their confidence in the British
Government. A telegram received from the Sharif, congratulating them upon
their zeal in the Arab cause and regretting that he had not had time to send
a representative to Kuwait, confirmed the identity of his aims with their own,
and in a further message he apologised for any deficiencies in his previous
letters, on the ground that while he was in the throes of war he might
unintentionally fall short as a correspondent. Hie dream of Aiab unity
which engaged the imagination of the Liberals of Damascus during t ic
year before the war has been brought nearer fulfilment than diearns are
wont to come, but the role of presiding genius.has been recast. Instead o
the brilliant, unscrupulous Saiyid Talib, gyrating in the blast of his own
ambition, the Chiefs of Eastern and Western Arabia have united at the
instance of the British Government.
24. Besides this knitting together of Arab leaders, the meeting at Kuwait
has produced certain immediate results. In the first place the extent and
nature of Ibn Sa’ud’s share in future hostilities with Ibn Rashid, if such
should occur, were agreed upon. He undertook^to maintain 4,000 men um ei
arms ; if Ibn Rashid moved in force towards the Iraq, he would move up
parallel with him towards Zubair and join the friendly tribes and a
contingent from Kuwait, He informed the friendly Shaikhs that he would
support them if Ibn Rashid threatened to attack them m strength. If,
however, Ibn Rashid should remain at Hail, Ibn Sa ud would harass and
attack him as opportunity offered, using the Qasnn as a base. In view o
the strain upon his resources during the last two years, he has been gi e
3 000 rifles with ammunition, as well as four machine-guns, and gianted a
monthly subsidy of 5 ,OOOL to cover the expenses he will incur in maintaining